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ABSTRACT 
 
Pathways Analysis for State Proliferators. 
 (May 2011) 
Michael Reece Mella, B.S., Ohio State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
 A computational tool to assess the most likely path a state proliferator would take 
in making a nuclear weapon was created in a Bayesian network. The purpose of this 
work was to create a tool to facilitate analysts and policymakers in learning about state 
proliferation. In carrying out this work, a previous Bayesian network based on nuclear 
weapon proliferation was expanded to include dual-use export controlled technologies. 
The constant nodes in the network quantifying technical capability, international 
networking, and available infrastructure were developed to be based on pertinent 
characteristics that were appropriately weighted. To verify the network, nine historical 
cases of state proliferation were tested over time, and the enrichment and weapon 
pathways were graphed. The network sufficiently modeled the cases, so it was 
concluded that, while one can never truly being able to sufficiently validate a network of 
this type, sufficient verification was achieved. The tool was used to gain knowledge and 
insight concerning technology transfers with four countries in hypothetical cases. This 
exercise proved that the network can in fact be used to learn about state proliferation 
under different policies and conditions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I.A. Objectives and Motivations 
 With the vast spread of technology globally, the threat of nuclear weapon 
proliferation is more real today than ever before. More countries than ever possess the 
latent capabilities to construct these ultimate weapons of mass destruction. The strategic 
and security implications of nuclear weapons make it a priority to attempt to prevent 
their proliferation. From the vantage point of the United States, in order to choose the 
correct postures and enact the right policies it is necessary to be able to assess a given 
nation‟s nuclear aspirations. This means examining the determining forces that push a 
nation towards the creation of one of these weapons, the skills and facilities they possess 
to carry out such a task, and the resources required in making the weapon. 
 It is becoming more important from an intelligence analyst and policymaker 
standpoint to accurately assess the paths a state may take to make a nuclear weapon, how 
far along the various paths the state is, and the time frame to reach points in that path.  A 
computational tool that would assist an intelligence analyst or policymaker to determine 
the most likely path a state would take in making a nuclear weapon would be beneficial. 
Such a tool would facilitate the best policies at the best times. It can suggest policies that 
may increase the time necessary for a given state to complete its weapons program and 
provide time for further diplomatic efforts to take place.1 
  
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
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 The objectives are as follows: 
1. Develop a network with the capability to predict the most likely path a state 
might take in proliferation, while incorporating evidence and motivations as a 
means to adjust these pathways. 
2. Assess the relative impact of indigenous knowledge development and access to 
technology on the choice to proliferate. 
3. Explore the impact of loose export control rules on the likelihood of 
proliferation. 
 The ability to learn from this computational tool is an important contribution to 
the future of the nonproliferation regime. It will provide quantitative analysis to support 
timely decisions to halt the spread of these weapons. 
I.B. Proliferation Theories 
 Given the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the immense strategic and 
political weight they bear, it has long been a topic of interest as to why nations decide to 
create them in the first place.2-6 Examining the motivations for creating such weapons is 
a complex process. These motivations are the driving force behind the decision to make 
such a weapon as well as several of the specific pathway choices made.7  The area of 
study that seeks to answer the question as to why states seek nuclear weapons is called 
proliferation determinism. 
Realist 
 The two primary schools of thought on why nations decide to go nuclear in the 
first place are broken into the realist and the idealist philosophies. The realists view a 
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nation‟s acquiring nuclear technical capabilities to be the key variable that ultimately 
determines the incidence of proliferation.2 The idealists on the other hand believe there 
are other forces acting, and states are ultimately driven towards making a nuclear 
weapon by the idea that it is beneficial or necessary.2 Ultimately the realist viewpoint 
sees technical ability as the only limitation to a world run rampant with nuclear weapons. 
Despite numerous examples to the contrary throughout twentieth century history, realists 
contend that eventually events will cause every nation to seek such a weapon. As a result 
of this line of thinking, realists view the supply-side technology controls as a necessary 
virtue for the nonproliferation regime.2 
Idealist 
 The idealist viewpoint looks at proliferation pressures on the international, 
individual, and domestic levels. Idealists see nations as generally wanting to follow 
international norms and be perceived as good denizens of the earth.2 Idealists perceive 
open societies as better followers of nonproliferation practices. On an individual level, 
proliferation is viewed as an emotional decision made by a top leader.2 The domestic 
level may be plagued by numerous concoctions by national elites that push for the 
creation of such a device. Some of the concoctions include emphasizing a country‟s 
insecurity or its poor international standing, portraying the bomb as the best solution to 
these problems, articulating the political, economic, and technical feasibility of acquiring 
nuclear weapons, and successfully associating these arguments with cultural norms and 
political priorities.3 The idealist worldview errs when framing proliferators as outside the 
norm. The idealist worldview tends to bolster stereotypes and paints an image of nations 
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who choose the nuclear route as rogues, which clearly does not describe countries like 
India. Unlike the realists, however, the idealists stress that nuclear proliferation occurs 
specifically and not generally.8 This concept is in accord with what has historically 
occurred and has allowed more insight into the timing of proliferation decisions.2  
 What is gleaned from the comparison of the realist and idealist theories is that a 
useful computational tool designed to assess the paths a nation could take in making a 
nuclear weapon should incorporate individual country data, including raw national 
statistics and current geopolitical forces pushing that nation towards the bomb decision. 
The tool should assess the required resources for making the bomb including 
technologies that are under export control regulations. Including export control rules will 
allow an analyst or policymaker to see how the path a nation is taking might be altered if 
such rules are enforced. A tool incorporating the driving forces from both proliferation 
philosophies would more accurately describe the most likely path as opposed to one that 
only focused on elements from one philosophy. 
I.C. Making a Nuclear Weapon 
 Once the decision to go nuclear is made, there are many possible paths a nation 
can take to reach their end goals. The paths being considered in the following work can 
be broken into two routes, a uranium path and a plutonium path. The uranium path 
involves enrichment pathways and leads to either a gun type weapon or implosion type 
weapon. The plutonium path involves reactors and reprocessing facilities and leads to an 
implosion weapon. The following is brief descriptions of the paths stating the general 
steps that need to be taken to make a nuclear weapon.9 
 5 
Uranium Path
 
 In order to make a uranium weapon the following steps need to be taken. First 
the uranium needs to be obtained through mining. The mining step requires geologists, 
mining engineers, and mining equipment.10 Next, the uranium, which is in the form of 
U3O8, has to be purified to rid the material of impurities such as boron, cadmium, 
chlorine, and rare earth elements. This can be done by solvent extraction processes. The 
next step is for the purified U3O8 to be converted into uranium hexafluoride, UF6. This 
process is performed at a uranium conversion facility. The two chemical processes 
commonly used in conversion are the dry hydrofluor process and the wet solvent 
extraction process.  
 Within the dry hydrofluor process, the U3O8 is ground to a fine powder. Next, the 
ground material enters a fluidized bed reactor where it is kept at a temperature of 1000 to 
1200 degrees Fahrenheit.  This step converts the U3O8 to UO2 The crude uranium 
dioxide UO2 is passed to two successive hydrofluorination fluidized bed reactors, where 
interaction occurs with anhydrous hydrogen fluoride at a temperature of 900 to 1000 
degree Fahrenheit. Uranium tetrafluoride is produced and treated at high temperatures 
with fluorine gas to form UF6.11 
 The wet solvent extraction process uses a similar method to achieve UF6. The 
difference is that the solvent extraction is performed prior to the reduction, 
hydrofluorination, and fluorination steps to remove impurities.11 Both of these processes 
require the skills and abilities of chemical engineers. 
 6 
 The next step in making a nuclear weapon is for the uranium to be enriched in 
the isotope 235U. Uranium with enrichment greater than 20% is known as highly 
enriched uranium (HEU). For a nuclear weapon, an enrichment of 90% or more, which 
is known as weapons grade, is desirable. The possible methods for enriching uranium 
include gaseous diffusion, gaseous centrifuge, aerodynamic, electromagnetic separation, 
and laser enrichment. All of these methods are large scale projects that use an abundance 
of resources and manpower from a variety of technical fields. 
 Gaseous diffusion is a process based on the physical principle that average 
energies of molecules with differing masses are the same in a gas. The principle implies 
that the lighter molecules will on average move faster. The UF6 gas hits a barrier with 
pores on the order of 25 nanometers. The lighter 235U molecules hit the barrier more 
frequently due to their greater velocity and hence pass through more often. The 
separation factor, that is, the amount of 235U molecules that pass through as compared to 
238U is very small because the velocities of the two are not very different. Therefore, 
numerous stages and cascades are needed to continue passing the gas through until the 
desired enrichment is achieved. Blowing the gas through the semiporous membrane 
takes tremendous energy. This necessitates large facilities and cooling requirements for 
the gaseous diffusion process.10,11 
 Gaseous centrifuge enrichment utilizes the centrifugal force and the diffusive 
nature of gas to manipulate 235U and 238U in their gaseous UF6 form. Essentially, a 
hollow cylindrical tube is filled with gas and accelerated by an electric motor to large 
velocities. The gas settles into dynamic equilibrium as a result of the centrifugal force 
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pushing outward and the diffusive nature of the gas seeking to redistribute the gas 
equally in the volume.12 A countercurrent flow is established in the separation chamber 
and the convective flow carries the lighter 235U molecules to the top of the centrifuge and 
the heavier 238U molecule to the bottom.12 As with the gaseous diffusion method, the 
small separation factor requires numerous cascades of centrifuges to achieve the desired 
enrichment.12 There are a large number of components necessary for gaseous centrifuge. 
The main ones include, high strength rotors (made of either aluminum, maraging steel, 
or carbon fibers), high strength tubes, high speed motors, baffles, and balancing 
machines. Gaseous diffusion and gaseous centrifuge are the most common forms of 
enrichment in the world today. 
 Electromagnetic isotope separation is an enrichment method that takes advantage 
of the physical principle that ions of different masses in motion will bend at different 
radii under the influence of a magnetic field. The radius of the path traversed by an atom 
under the influence of a magnetic field is proportional to the momentum of the particle 
and inversely proportional to the magnetic field strength. Current carrying coils and 
electric power are needed to produce the magnetic fields. Ionizing the uranium is most 
easily done when it is in the molecular form of uranium tetrachloride, UCl4. The UCl4 is 
heated to a gaseous state and then ionized by bombarding it with electrons. The resulting 
UCl4 ions are accelerated through an electric potential. These ions then pass through a 
vacuum chamber under the influence of a magnetic field. Finally, the ions are bent into 
separation bins called ion collectors. The devices used for this process are called 
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calutrons. Since a given calutron separates miniscule amounts of 235U atoms, a large 
number is needed to reach an amount of 235U necessary to make a nuclear weapon.10 
 Aerodynamic enrichment technology is another method which uses centrifugal 
forces to separate the 235U and 238U. A jet nozzle with a throat width of about 0.03mm is 
made whereby UF6 diluted in H2 can flow through it. The nozzle curves and releases the 
gas into two pathways, one for the lighter stream and one for the heavier stream. The 
centrifugal forces cause the separation of the light and heavy isotopes into the two paths. 
Like the other enrichment technologies, a large number of jet nozzle stages are required 
to achieve the desired enrichment level.6 
 The newest enrichment technology is laser enrichment. This process takes 
advantage of the sharp but slightly displaced absorption lines between 238U and 235U. It is 
possible with a fine tuned laser to preferentially ionize the 235U atoms and then 
electrostatically separate them from the 238U.11 The ionization can be done with a variety 
of lasers including copper vapor lasers, neodymium-doped lasers, and Alexandrite lasers. 
The technology is still in its developmental stage so a nation that would choose this path 
would be technically advanced. 
Once the uranium is enriched to weapons grade, a state has two different weapon 
paths to choose from: the HEU gun-type or the HEU implosion type. The HEU gun type 
is a crude design involving the collision of two subcritical pieces of HEU that together 
form a supercritical state.  Gun-type weapons are the easiest to make as they require 
conventional chemical explosives to propel the one piece into the other and a tamper 
usually made of tungsten carbide that helps keep the pieces together long enough for the 
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weapon to produce its intended yield. The gun design is the lowest technology nuclear 
weapon and the least efficient with respect to the use of HEU.13 
 The more sophisticated HEU weapon is the implosion-type. Implosion weapons 
are more efficient than gun-type weapons; however, this efficiency comes at increased 
complexity.13 An HEU implosion weapon requires the careful machining of a pit of 
subcritical HEU that has a hollow center where a neutron initiator is placed. The physics 
behind an implosion weapon involve the pit of subcritical uranium or plutonium being 
compressed by the explosive force of conventional explosives until its density increases 
sufficiently to make the mass supercritical. At the point of peak compression, a burst of 
neutrons is released by the neutron initiator at the very center of the pit. In order to keep 
the weapon together long enough to obtain sufficient yield, a tamper is used. If the 
tamper does not also double as a reflector, a separate material, usually made of 
beryllium, is used to reflect neutrons back into the core of the weapon. Some designs 
also include a pusher made of high strength material like aluminum or beryllium. The 
complexity of the implosion weapon makes this a high efficiency weapon that requires 
an advanced level of technology. 
Plutonium Path 
 The steps and technologies needed for a state to develop a plutonium weapon 
differ from that of the uranium weapons. The first significantly different step is the 
acquisition of a nuclear reactor. Plutonium production reactors use uranium metal as the 
fuel and if the reactor in use is a heavy water reactor (HWR) or graphite moderated 
reactor, natural uranium can be used for the metal. This however, requires the 
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acquisition of heavy water, D2O, which is composed of deuterium, a hydrogen atom with 
a neutron in the nucleus, and oxygen. Heavy water can be made at a heavy water 
production plant. The heavy water plant provides importance to a state proliferator 
because it gives the state another weapon path that completely avoids the enrichment 
paths.14 Heavy water plants necessitate a technical infrastructure that is on par with 
ammonia production and alcohol distillation. Practical ways of making heavy water 
include distilling liquid hydrogen and chemical exchange processes that take advantage 
of the affinities of deuterium and hydrogen for various compounds.14 
 The fuel is burned in the reactor creating plutonium. When the spent fuel is taken 
out of the reactor, roughly 1% is plutonium. For an implosion weapon, it is desirable for 
the plutonium to consist of approximately 93% 239Pu. This is known as weapons grade 
plutonium. Plutonium coming from a typical power reactor is between 50-60% enriched 
in 239Pu, which is known as reactor-grade plutonium.15 In order to obtain higher 239Pu 
fractions, the fuel must be kept in the reactor for shorter periods of time. Due to the short 
time frame, power reactors are not good candidates for producing weapons grade 
plutonium because of the frequency of shutdowns. Plutonium production reactors may 
be able to refuel while operating to avoid delays in production. Due to the high 
spontaneous fission rate of plutonium, it is not able to be used for the gun-type design.10 
 Once the spent nuclear fuel is obtained from the reactor, the fuel must undergo 
reprocessing in order to extract the useful plutonium. The first step is to chop the spent 
fuel into pieces. Next, the pieces are dissolved in nitric acid. Solvent extraction is then 
used to separate the uranium and plutonium from the waste products. The most common 
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method is the PUREX process which uses tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) and liquid-liquid 
extraction principals, combined with oxidation-reduction chemical reactions.11 The 
plutonium is recovered as the nitrate Pu(NO3)4 and then converted to plutonium oxide.  
The plutonium oxide is then converted to a metal with the help of high purity calcium or 
magnesium. The plutonium is reacted with either the calcium or magnesium with a 
fluoride salt at a high temperature in a sealed vessel.15 The metal is then washed in 
HNO3 to remove residue, washed with water, and melted again in a furnace. 
 The remainder of the materials and steps in making the plutonium weapon are 
identical to those of the uranium implosion weapon. 
I.D. Previous Work 
 The previous literature on this topic focuses mainly on proliferation 
determination and tapers off when it comes to computational methods for assessing 
pathways. There are a few recently created computational networks that can be built 
upon to gain further insight.  
 In previous related work, support is found to bolster both the realist and idealist 
views of proliferation. Another aspect of proliferation that has also been under study is 
the impact of technology transfers of sensitive nuclear assistance. A computational tool 
that assesses the most likely path a nation would pursue must take into account the 
numerous characteristics, both tangible and intangible, that push a state towards 
developing a nuclear weapon and assisting them along that chosen path.  
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Meyer (1984) 
 Research conducted by Meyer provided the first statistical model that attempted 
to explain why countries proliferate.4 This study was an overview of the many 
proliferation determinants applied to historical cases. For several countries, nuclear 
propensity, which was defined as the extent of a nation‟s explicit predisposition toward 
initiating the manufacture of nuclear weapons, was plotted as a function of time. The 
conclusions argued against the realist theory of nuclear weapon proliferation in saying 
that the decisions to go nuclear were not solely driven by technological means but were 
largely impacted by political and military decisions. 
Singh and Way (2004) 
 Another study performed a quantitative test of the correlates of nuclear 
proliferation.5 A hazard and multinomial logit model were used to test theories of 
nuclear proliferation. In this research, the path to nuclear weaponry was broken into 
three stages that included exploring, pursuing, and acquiring nuclear weapons. The 
researchers concluded that nuclear weapons proliferation was strongly correlated to the 
level of economic development, the external threat environment, the lack of great-power 
security guarantees, and a low level of integration into the world economy.  
PNNL (2005) 
 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) conducted a study of past 
proliferation events to gain insight on future proliferation.9 The report describes how 
conclusions regarding the time necessary for completion of technologies and nuclear 
material production in addition to the approaches taken for acquiring the technology can 
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be drawn from evaluating historical trends in nuclear technology development. The work 
shows numerous historical cases and the time required by states to develop certain 
technologies. 
Hymans (2006) 
 Hymans did a qualitative study which compared the realist and idealist theories 
on nuclear weapon proliferation.2 The work revealed insight behind what some theorize 
to be the driving force behind the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Realists contend 
that access to technology is the limiting factor on whether states pursue a nuclear 
weapon and idealists believe that there are numerous other factors that push a nation 
towards the weapon. 
Jo and Gartzke (2007) 
 A study that looked at the determinants of nuclear proliferation quantitatively 
was performed by Jo and Gartzke.6 The work performed a statistical analysis of nuclear 
proliferation that incorporated numerous independent variables. It was found that 
security concerns and technological capabilities and important determinants of whether 
states decide form nuclear weapons programs and security concerns, economic 
capabilities, and domestic politics help explain the possession of nuclear weapons.  
Ford (2008) 
 A network that displayed the pathways necessary for a terrorist group or rogue 
state to acquire special nuclear material (SNM) was developed by Ford.16 SNM is 
defined as plutonium, U-233, or uranium enriched in U-235 or U-233. The network 
focused on three different types of nodes including skills, facilities, and materials. A 
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number of input characteristics were created for each of the categories. Using the 
available resources an organization has and the nodes they already have access to, the 
most likely path towards acquiring SNM were assessed. The work showed the structure 
of proliferation pathways but did not show the most likely path. The network also did 
not reveal which parts of the pathways hold greater importance over others. 
Freeman (2008) 
 The most pertinent source to the current work was the Bayesian network 
established by Freeman.7 In this work, a Bayesian network for nuclear proliferation was 
established that tested the hypothesis that motivations, lead to intentions, which in turn 
lead to pathways. The network was structured off the idealist view which seeks to 
explain the other reasons why states decide to go nuclear besides having just the 
technical capability to do so. The Bayesian network tried to establish the relative threat 
that organizations and states pose. The network, however, did not include most export 
controlled dual-use technologies and it loosely quantified a nation‟s available 
infrastructure, technical capability, and international networking. In addition, the work 
did not test historical cases to verify the network.  
Kroenig (2009) 
 Kroenig has studied the impact of sensitive nuclear assistance to nuclear weapon 
proliferation.17 A hazard model was used to see determine the impact assistance had on 
proliferation in addition to the impact had by other characteristics such as GDP, 
industrial capacity, and regime type. The study determined that the sensitive assistance 
had the greatest impact of all the characteristics. The conclusions drawn from the 
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research were that states that are better able to produce nuclear weapons, due to either 
international assistance or domestic capacity are more likely to do so, hence aligning 
with a realist proliferation view.  
Potter (2010) 
 In a two volume book, Potter provided an extensive qualitative and quantitative 
study of nuclear proliferation.18 The work considered theoretical perspectives regarding 
the reasons proliferation occurs. Potter elaborated upon a state‟s propensity for a nuclear 
weapon, the reasons that decisions to pursue the bomb are made, and the impact of 
proliferation on other states‟ attitude toward proliferation. The study delivered 
proliferation projections over the next decade in addition to effective policy measures to 
prevent proliferation in the future. 
I.E. Overview 
 After considering the previous work done on topics related to the problem of 
finding the most likely path a nation would take in making a nuclear weapon, it was 
decided that Bayesian analysis would best model the likelihood. Bayesian analysis is 
used in many cases where courses of action are chosen that involve tradeoffs between 
multiple objectives.19 Bayesian analysis is able to give a viable assessment of the belief 
one has in a given outcome, making it useful in this situation when reporting to an 
intelligence analyst or policymaker about the perceived likelihood of a given path based 
on numerous characteristics and evidence. 
 The existing Bayesian network created by Freeman provided a useful framework 
on which to expand. The motivations drive the system, automatically including aspects 
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of proliferation determinism. The way the network is established, the constant nodes that 
include available infrastructure, international networking, and technical capability are 
integrated into key positions into the network. There is room to expand upon these nodes 
to incorporate numerous other characteristics that assess a nation‟s nuclear weapon 
potential. 
 In order to develop a computational tool that yields the most likely path a state 
would take in making a nuclear weapon the following steps will be taken. First, the 
existing Bayesian network will be expanded to include dual-use export controlled 
technologies. Second, the nodes in the network quantifying technical capability, 
international networking, and available infrastructure will be developed based on a list of 
weighted characteristics. Third, the network will be executed for nine historical cases of 
proliferation by states for verification and validation purposes. Finally, hypothetical 
cases will be used to learn from the network and the results will be assessed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
CHAPTER II 
BAYESIAN NETWORK ANALYSIS 
II.A. Bayes’ Theorem 
 Bayesian networks are fundamentally based on Bayes‟ theorem. Bayes‟ theorem 
is derived from the conditional probability which states that if there are two statistically 
independent events, A and B, the probability of A occurring given that B has occurred,  
       is equal to the probability of both A and B occurring,        divided by the 
probability that B occurs:  
       
      
    
                                                         (1) 
 Eq. (1) means that the chance of A happening because B occurred increases as the 
chance that they both happen together increases and it increases even more if the chance 
of B occurring at all decreases. So long as A and B are mutually exclusive, one can write 
the same equation with the A and B flipped: 
       
      
    
                                                       (2) 
 Since the probability of the intersection of these events is the same, algebraic 
manipulation of the two equations will yield Bayes‟ equation: 20 
       
          
    
                                                   (3) 
 To expand upon this form, one notes that the probability of B is equal to the 
probability of the intersection of A and B plus the probability of the complement of A 
(Ac) and B:  
                                            ,            (4) 
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which, when substituted back into Eq. (3), yields 
       
          
                       
                                              (5) 
If state A has more than just two states it could be partitioned, then the probability of B 
is: 
                                                                (6) 
Therefore Bayes‟ theorem for an event A with any number of states is: 
        
            
              
                                               (7) 
 The right hand side of Eq. (7) gives the posterior probability of event A while in 
the left hand side one inserts the prior probability of A not considering any other events. 
When applied to the proliferation network in this work, the prior probabilities, such as 
the belief of a state going down a certain path, will be used to calculate posterior 
probabilities, such as the likelihood of the state going down the path given that the fact 
that they have certain technologies. 
 Bayes‟ theorem provides the foundation for the network which will be expanded 
to quantify the most likely path a state might take in nuclear proliferation. Within the 
Bayesian network, different nodes will be mathematically computed by the Bayes‟ 
equation allowing flexibility in assigning the conditional probabilities of certain 
elements given the existence of other elements. The Bayesian network provides a means 
to test theories and hypothesis in a deductive manner by observing the outcome of the 
network. The testing of the deductive reasoning process was shown by Freeman when 
the network was used to test the hypothesis that motivations led to intentions, which in 
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turn lead to pathways.7 The network can also be used for inductive reasoning by 
observing what happens when it is applied to both historical and hypothetical cases and 
trying to see an insightful pattern by which to form a hypothesis. For example, the 
current work seeks to apply this inductive reasoning to cases of state proliferation to see 
the impact of loose export controls. 
II.B. Bayesian Network 
 A Bayesian network is a graphical model for representing conditional 
independencies between a set of random variables.21 Such a network is able to 
graphically show the joint probability distribution of a number of such variables. The 
variables are represented graphically by nodes and they are connected by arrows if a 
given node is conditioned upon another. The node that the arrow is coming from is the 
parent node and the node it is going to is the child node. 
 A good example of a Bayesian network is one used for medical diagnostics. 
When trying to determine what a patient has, there may be several nodes representing 
different illnesses. These nodes would be child nodes to several parent nodes, which 
represent evidence for the child node, including tests, genetic history, and health habits. 
A doctor may insert his initial beliefs about how such pieces of evidence impact the 
likelihood of an illness so the network can calculate an initial probability of the patient 
having the syndrome. The network can then be manipulated after more evidence is 
gathered and pieces of information are known for certain. The Bayesian network 
recalculates the probabilities and gives a new set for the likelihood of each illness. This 
 20 
type of network is also useful for state proliferation pathways because initial beliefs can 
be inserted and then further evidence changes the likelihood of the outcomes. 
II.C. Detailed Description of Freeman Network 
 The Bayesian network designed by Freeman is shown in Fig. 1. The network was 
designed in the software package Netica.22 The user defines, connects, and designates 
probabilities for self-created nodes and Netica then calculates values that represent the 
belief that a given state is true based on Bayes‟ theorem. 
 Equations can be typed into Netica for a given node, or the corresponding truth 
table could be filled out. Examples of these are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 The equations themselves do not define the relationship between nodes, they 
merely fill out the truth tables and the Bayes‟ equation determines the mathematical 
relationship.7 The truth tables are tables that give the probabilities of a state being true or 
false depending on a piece of evidence.  
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Fig. 1. The Bayesian network designed by Freeman. 
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Fig. 2. An example showing how equations can be directly typed into Netica. 
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of a truth table in Netica. 
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 Nodes can be activated (turned on to 100% true state ) or de-activated (turned to 
100% false state) simply by clicking on these respective states (see Fig. 4). This allows 
the user to incorporate evidence into the network by using the evidence to reflect 
knowledge about states. 
 
   
Fig. 4. Example of an activation and a de-activation of a node in the network. 
 
 The network designed by Freeman was set up so that the nodes were connected 
going from general, meaning pathway nodes, to specific, meaning pieces of evidence. 
This construct, shown in Fig. 5, was established for a number of reasons. First, designing 
the network this way allows pieces of evidence to impact each other. Second, this 
construct allows evidence that supports a given pathway to bolster the probabilities of 
other nodes leading to that pathway. Third, when a given pathway is chosen, the 
evidence node probabilities increase at different rates, without having all the 
probabilities equally likely. 
 As a result of this set-up, activating an evidence node made both the pathway and 
all other evidence nodes leading to that pathway true and any other pathways false. In 
order to correct for this non-sensible result, another node was added at the branching 
points between pathway nodes and evidence nodes. This node is known as an inverted 
node, and its states are those of the evidence nodes plus one state which represents all of 
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the states. The node is inverted because when a given evidence node is true, it is false in 
the inverted node. When all the evidence nodes are true, the state which represents all of 
the evidence nodes is then true so that the according pathway is indicated to be true. In 
order to determine the impact that a given evidence node has on a given pathway node, 
the truth table for each evidence node must be written to have a small chance of being 
false if the corresponding inverted node state is saying it is true and vice versa. The 
amount the evidence node differs from being absolutely true or absolutely false 
determines the evidence node‟s impact on the pathway node. The Freeman thesis 
provides more detailed description of the network behavior.7 
 
 
Fig. 5. The design of the Freeman network in Netica. 
 
II.D. Expansion of the Bayesian Network 
One of the goals of the current work was to explore the impact loose export 
control rules have on the likelihood of a country‟s proliferation. This can be performed 
in a Bayesian network by adding nodes that represent export controlled technologies and 
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then seeing how they impact the probabilities of other nodes as their probabilities are 
changed. The Netica software facilitates this process through simple activation and de-
activation of nodes. By switching the nodes, one can see the impact of such technologies 
on the network as a whole.  
The first step in this research was the expansion of the currently existing 
Bayesian network to include export controlled technology. A detailed list of such items 
was obtained from an IAEA document on nuclear related dual-use technology 
transfers.23 The list was broken up into sections that included materials, uranium isotope 
separation equipment and components, heavy-water production plant related equipment, 
implosion systems development equipment, explosives and related equipment, and 
nuclear testing equipment and components. The Bayesian network was analyzed to see 
where these items and categories would best fit. The nodes were then added into their 
appropriate locations. 
 Under the materials category, high-purity calcium and high-purity magnesium, 
used for converting the uranium and plutonium into metallic form, were added. They 
were placed in the network near the uranium and plutonium pits as shown in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 6. The addition of high purity calcium and magnesium to the network. 
 
 The enrichment section had numerous nodes added. These included electrolytic 
cells, rotor and bellows equipment, centrifugal multiplane balancing machines, filament 
winding machines, bellows, maraging steel, carbon composites, and high-strength 
aluminum. For laser enrichment, the following nodes were added: neodymium doped 
laser, argon son lasers, copper vapor lasers, Alexandrite lasers, pulsed excimer laser, 
carbon dioxide laser, single mode dye oscillators, regular dye oscillators, and Raman 
shifters. The complete enrichment section is shown in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7. The enrichment section of the network. 
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 Another section that was greatly expanded upon was the explosives package. The 
additions to this section included capacitors, high-current pulse generators, detonators, 
flash x-ray generators, pulsed electron accelerators, multi-stage light gas guns, 
mechanical rotating mirror cameras, electronic streak and framing cameras, velocity 
interferometers, manganin gauges, quartz pressure transducers, explosive substances, 
cold cathode tubes, and triggered spark gaps. This is shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. The expansion of the explosives package section. 
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 A section added that was not in the previous existing Bayesian network was the 
heavy water production plant. The nodes that were added to this section included 
specialized packages, pumps, exchange tray columns, distillation columns, and ammonia 
synthesis convertors. The heavy water section was connected to the plutonium implosion 
node as it facilitates making plutonium and is shown in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. The heavy water production plant section of the network. 
 
 Another section added was nuclear testing. It was added to the node that gave the 
probability of a state having a nuclear device. The associated equipment and components 
included non-modular analog oscilloscopes, modular analog oscilloscopes, analog 
sampling oscilloscopes, digital oscilloscopes, transient recorders, photomultiplier tubes, 
and pulse generators. These are shown in Fig. 10. 
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Fig. 10. The nuclear testing part of the network. 
 
 The completed network is shown in the Fig. 11. The yellow nodes at the top of 
the network are intention nodes and the constant nodes representing available 
infrastructure, international networking, and technical capability, which feed values into 
the network at key locations. The top left of the network is the enrichment section and 
the top right of the network is the reprocessing section. The middle right of the network 
is the weapons package section and the bottom right of the network is the tamper, 
pusher, and reflector section. The bottom left of the network is the weapon and testing 
section. The nodes that appear in blue are activated in this picture. 
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Fig. 11. The completely expanded Bayesian Freeman-Mella network. 
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CHAPTER III 
METRIC DEVELOPMENT FOR CONSTANT NODES 
 The Freeman network includes three constant nodes: international networking, 
technical capability, and available infrastructure. The individual using the network 
would rank these three categories on a scale from zero to one based on the evaluation of 
the relative strength of these characteristics for the state. Freeman did not provide any 
methodology for consistently assessing the value for these nodes. This could lead to an 
unwanted degree of subjectivity in the analysis. In an effort to eliminate this subjectivity, 
a method was developed to estimate the values of the constant nodes based on published 
metrics for a state. 
III.A. Calculating the Metrics 
 The value of each constant node was estimated using multi-attribute utility 
theory.24 
         
 
                                                              (8) 
Eq. (8) represents the value of the constant node. The variable    is a metric for a given 
attribute i,     is a function that maps the metric    to a value between zero and one, and 
      is a weighting factor for the importance of the attribute to the overall constant node 
value. The weights are relative weights which are constrained by 
     
 
                                                          (9) 
The values of    have a minimum and maximum possible value: 
                                                                (10) 
 A linear functional was used for the utility of the attributes which has the form: 
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                          (11) 
This function is zero when the value of x equals the minimum and one when x equals the 
maximum. For simplicity, a set of weights were established for each attribute that ranged 
from 0 to 1. This implied that the value of      was a normalized weight such that: 
     
  
   
 
 
                                               (12) 
The calculations for these metrics were performed using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
An example of this spreadsheet is shown in Appendix A. 
III.B. Attributes 
 Much of the literature on the topic of nuclear proliferation has more to do with 
proliferation determinism than it does with attributes that measure a state‟s available 
infrastructure, technical capability, and international networking as applied to nuclear 
weapon proliferation. It was also desirable that the number of attributes be as small as 
possible, and focused on those most pertinent to proliferation pathways. The data for the 
metrics were collected from a variety of sources.25-31 
Technical Capability Attributes 
 There are numerous measures of technological capabilities at the national level. 
Indices such as the WEF Technology Index, UNDP Technology Achievement Index, 
UNIDO Industrial Development Scoreboard, and the RAND Science and Technology 
Capacity Index rank nations based on a number of characteristics.21 The characteristics 
are classified under categories such as the generation of technology and innovation, 
infrastructure and technology diffusion, human capital, and competitiveness. It was 
concluded that the RAND Science and Technology Capacity measure had the most 
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relevant characteristics.26 The RAND measure takes into account eight indicators that 
include GNP per capita, tertiary science enrollment, research and development 
expenditures, number of institutions and universities, number of scientists and engineers, 
number of patents from both the USPTO (United States Patent Office) and EPO 
(European Patent Office), and the number of science and technology publications and 
co-authored scientific and technical papers.26 Using these indicators, a synthetic index 
was created through a standardized formula with different outcomes occurring according 
to the weights assigned to each indicator. 
 The RAND index is useful to this study because it combined numerous 
informative indicators. However, it was decided that additional metrics were needed to 
tailor this category to the construction of a nuclear device. A set of metrics were added 
that reflected the existence of types of nuclear facilities in a country. The relevant 
facilities are uranium enrichment plants, uranium mines, uranium conversion plants, and 
heavy water plants. It was determined that the number of such facilities was not related 
to nuclear weapons capability. The next question to answer was whether the number of 
such facilities indicated more or less ability. Thus, it was decided to place the maximum 
at one and the minimum at zero. Using binary values makes the input for the facility 
attribute a simple one for „yes‟ the country has one or more of such a facility or zero for 
„no‟ the country does not have that facility. 
 The final attribute added was the number of nuclear engineering university 
programs in a country. Technical capability for creating a nuclear weapon is dependent 
on the number of nuclear engineering program for the obvious reason that more 
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programs lead to more people who are capable of working on such projects. For this 
reason, the characteristic is not a simple binary value like the facilities. The 
characteristic is relatively easy to find and it is a good measure of training for nuclear 
weapon construction. The number of nuclear engineering programs complements the 
RAND index, which takes into account institutions and universities in general. 
Weightings and Rankings of States Based on Technical Capability Attributes 
 Proper weights were established for each of the six attributes for technical 
capability. This was determined by choosing a set of weights for the attributes by 
intuition, and evaluating the country rankings produced by those weights, and then 
modifying the weights such that the country rankings match present day and historical 
case data. The RAND index was weighted high from the start due to the large amount of 
information it takes into account. The number of nuclear engineering programs was also 
deemed to be ranked high. Due to the difficulty of enrichment and heavy water 
production, having these facilities says much about a nation‟s technical capability. The 
conversion plants and mines were ranked the lowest. The initial listing of nations was 
compared to expert opinions on the rankings and the metric weightings were adjusted to 
set the rankings to match those opinions. The finalized weightings and are shown in 
Table I and the finalized country ranking is shown in Table II. 
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TABLE I 
Weighting of Technical Capability Attributes 
Attribute Weights 
Number of Nuclear Engineering Programs 
Uranium Enrichment Capability 
Uranium Mining Capability 
Conversion Capability 
Heavy Water Production Capability 
RAND Index 
0.8 
1.0 
0.1 
0.5 
0.65 
1.0 
 
 
TABLE II 
Ranking of Countries due to Weighting of Technical Capability Attributes 
Country Value 
1. United States 
2. China 
3. Japan 
4. India 
5. Argentina 
6. Russia 
7. United Kingdom 
8. France 
9. Brazil 
10. Pakistan 
11. Iran 
12. South Africa 
13. Australia 
14. Sweden 
15. Taiwan 
16. Switzerland 
17. Israel 
18. Turkey 
19. Saudi Arabia 
20. Syria 
21. Iraq 
22. Libya 
23. Algeria 
24. Myanmar 
0.852 
0.599 
0.585 
0.584 
0.574 
0.573 
0.536 
0.519 
0.450 
0.428 
0.420 
0.420 
0.370 
0.122 
0.117 
0.099 
0.096 
0.021 
0.011 
0.009 
0.004 
0.002 
0.001 
0.000 
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 The rankings in Table II agree with our general intuition. The U.S. tops the list 
followed by China and Japan. India, Argentina, Russian, the UK, and France are next. 
Brazil, Iran, Pakistan, and Australia are in the middle of the list. 
International Networking Attributes 
 Unlike technological capability, there was not a list of well-researched indices 
quantifying international networking between states. From an economic perspective, 
however, the best overall measure was foreign direct investment (FDI).32 The two 
categories of FDI are FDI at home and abroad. FDI at home is defined as the cumulative 
value of all investments in a given country by residents, usually companies, of other 
countries.28 Similarly, FDI abroad is defined as the cumulative value of all investments 
in foreign countries made by residents, usually companies, of the home country. 
To tailor the category to the nuclear weapon field, more characteristics needed to be 
considered. The best way to tailor the category was to introduce the number of 
connections to nuclear supplier nations. There is a finite list of capable nuclear supplier 
countries and several sources that give the links between a given nation and the supplier 
nations.17,27 Another useful characteristic that directly applies to nuclear weapons is the 
number of treaties and nuclear cooperation agreements a nation has signed. The treaties 
and nuclear cooperation agreements that were considered for this study include the 
following: 
 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
 38 
 Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 
 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 Open Skies Treaty 
 Outer Space Treaty 
 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
 Seabed Arms Control Treaty 
 South Pacific Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty 
 Strategic Arms Limitations Talk 
 Strategic Arms Limitations Talk II 
 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II 
 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
 Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
These four characteristics succinctly defined the international networking related to 
nuclear weapons. 
Weightings and Rankings of States Based on International Networking Attributes 
 When initiating the weighting process, weighted values were selected for the four 
international networking attributes.  These were again iterated upon until a finalized set 
of weights were established that produced country rankings that matched subject matter 
intuition. These are shown in Tables III and IV. 
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TABLE III 
Weighting for International Networking Attributes 
Attribute Weights 
FDI at home (US $) 
FDI abroad (US $) 
Nuclear Treaties/Agreements 
Connection to Nuclear Supplier Countries 
1.0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.75 
 
 
TABLE IV 
Ranking of Countries Due to Weighting of International Networking Attributes 
 
Country Value 
1. United States 
2. France 
3. United Kingdom 
4. Russia 
5. Australia 
6. Switzerland 
7. Japan 
8. Sweden 
9. China 
10. Brazil 
11. Iran 
12. India 
13. South Africa 
14. Iraq 
15. Turkey 
16. Libya 
17. Algeria 
18. Argentina 
19. Myanmar 
20. Saudi Arabia 
21. Taiwan 
22. Syria 
23. Israel 
24. Pakistan 
0.961 
0.589 
0.545 
0.430 
0.264 
0.252 
0.204 
0.194 
0.144 
0.116 
0.108 
0.104 
0.087 
0.085 
0.084 
0.076 
0.066 
0.064 
0.064 
0.058 
0.053 
         0.052 
0.038 
0.033 
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 The rankings shown in Table IV made intuitive sense. The United States was in 
the number one spot followed by France.  The UK and Russia are subsequent.  Near the 
bottom are countries which are in fact much more isolated such as Myanmar, Syria, and 
Pakistan. The list gave a ranking which makes sense on the international stage. 
Available Infrastructure Attributes  
 The available infrastructure of a state is a broad category that can comprise of 
many attributes. In the work by Singh and Way,12 an industrial capacity index that was 
based on both aggregate and per capita electricity and steel production was used as a 
correlate of nuclear proliferation.  Steel production and electricity production alone are 
not sufficient for describing a nation‟s available infrastructure for developing a nuclear 
weapon. This lacks several attributes for overall industrial capacity and any metrics for 
infrastructure.  
 The attributes were gross domestic product (GDP), GDP from industry, 
electricity production, industrial production growth percentage, uranium mine 
production, power reactor capacity, and research reactor capacity. The first two 
characteristics are general indicators of infrastructure. Electricity production is important 
due to the tremendous electrical input and output from nuclear facilities. The industrial 
production growth percentage was included because it serves as a future indicator. Also, 
a project the size of a nuclear weapon program would thrive better in a nation whose 
growth percentage was high, indicating expansion. The uranium mine production shows 
the base resource for nuclear activity available. Power reactor capacity is a good 
measure of overall nuclear activity. Power reactor capacity is a measure of overall power 
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resources available and that which can be diverted to weapons activity. Research reactor 
capacity is a good measure of a nation‟s infrastructure regarding the creation of 
knowledge about nuclear-related activity. The capacity of other nuclear facilities such as 
conversion, enrichment, and heavy water plants was left out of this category because 
these facilities were already taken into account in the technical capability category. 
Weightings and Rankings of States Based on Available Infrastructure Attributes 
 These weights were achieved using the same process as that used above. GDP, 
GDP from industry, and electricity production were all given the highest weight because 
they are the simplest measure of a country‟s overall infrastructure. The industrial 
production growth rate was weighted low since it also is not as pertinent to nuclear 
activity. Both power and research reactor capacity were weighted high since they are 
large indicators of nuclear infrastructure. Uranium mining capacity is weighted below 
the reactor capacities since it is easier to have compared to reactor infrastructure. The 
finalized ranking of these weights are shown in Table V. 
 
TABLE V 
Weighting of Available Infrastructure Attributes 
Attribute Weights 
GDP ($US) 
GDP from Industry ($US) 
Electricity Production (kWh) 
Industrial Production Growth Rate (%) 
Uranium Mining Capacity (tU/a) 
Power Reactor Capacity (MWe) 
Research Reactor Capacity (MWth) 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.2 
0.5 
0.8 
0.8 
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TABLE VI 
Ranking due to Weighting of Available Infrastructure Attributes 
Country Value 
1. United States 
2. China 
3. Russia 
4. Japan 
5. France 
6. India 
7. Australia 
8. United Kingdom 
9. Brazil 
10. Iran 
11. Taiwan 
12. South Africa 
13. Argentina 
14. Sweden 
15. Turkey 
16. Saudi Arabia 
17. Algeria 
18. Pakistan 
19. Switzerland 
20. Iraq 
21. Israel 
22. Libya 
23. Syria 
24. Myanmar 
0.804 
0.558 
0.346 
0.287 
0.236 
0.210 
0.145 
0.097 
0.092 
0.059 
0.054 
0.046 
0.043 
0.041 
0.041 
0.041 
0.035 
0.034 
0.032 
0.028 
0.026 
0.023 
0.022 
0.020 
 
 
 The ranking shown in Table VI is in accord with intuition. The list correctly 
displays the developed nations at the top and the less developed nations lower down. The 
United States is again at the top of the list. China, Russia, Japan, France, and India 
follow, all very capable nuclear powers. As expected, less developed countries such as 
Libya, Syria, and Myanmar rank near the bottom. Nations such as Iran, Sweden, and 
Argentina, rank near the middle. Nations such as Switzerland and Israel rank low 
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because of their size and resources available. The list displayed in Table VI shows an 
appropriate ranking of states regarding their available infrastructure as it pertains to 
nuclear weapon manufacturing.  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
CHAPTER IV 
NETWORK SIMULATIONS 
IV.A. Countries and Reasons Why Chosen 
 In order to study how the network shows pathways of countries over time, eight 
nations were selected to run through the network. Different nodes were activated, or in 
some cases de-activated, depending on the acquisition or blocking of technologies 
pertaining to nuclear weapon development. Numerous historical studies of nuclear 
histories of the countries were analyzed, and the important dates along the way were 
tracked in order to plot the pathways. The purpose was to see how accurately the 
network reflected the history of the countries‟ weapons programs to verify the network. 
The countries selected for this purpose were the Soviet Union, France, Israel, South 
Africa, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. 
 The Soviet Union was selected because it was one of the first to develop the 
bomb. The technology was young and it would be interesting to see how the pathways 
look in this nascent age of nuclear technology. France was chosen because their path to 
the bomb involved much technological momentum in which the problem was explored 
by a commission until it was solved perhaps before it was politically desired. Israel was 
selected due to its significance in the Middle East. South Africa was chosen to see if the 
network accurately modeled a technology transfer having a large impact on pathway 
choice. The transfer of interest was the aerodynamic enrichment technology from a 
German company. India was chosen because it was interesting to see what the model 
indicated about the pathways at the time of their first test in the late 1970s. Pakistan was 
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selected to see the impact of the A.Q. Khan network on the pathways and to see what 
present day paths they may be on. Iraq was chosen to see how close they were to the 
bomb prior to the Kuwaiti invasion. Finally, Iran was chosen due to their present day 
relevance as a proliferation concern and the wide range of nuclear technologies they 
explored. 
 In addition, to the eight countries run in an attempt to validate the network to an 
extent, one country was selected that gave up its nuclear weapon pursuits in order to 
model a null case. Sweden was selected because of their surprising advances towards 
being a nuclear armed nation and their dissolution of the program with their signing of 
the NPT. 
 In addition to the nine cases listed above, four hypothetical cases were tested on 
present day countries. The testing of the hypothetical cases was done in order to assess 
the impact of technology transfer on pathways and to see how useful the network is as a 
learning tool. The transfers of importance were reactor, enrichment, and reprocessing 
technologies. Also, the strength of export control laws were modeled by adding the 
above three technologies with the export control item nodes both on and off. The nations 
that were selected for this were Saudi Arabia, Syria, Myanmar, and Japan.  
 Saudi Arabia was a good candidate to run a hypothetical case on due to their 
geographic location in the Middle East and their relationship with United States. Saudi 
Arabia‟s position in an area of the world where proliferation is of great concern gives 
them potential motivation for nuclear proliferation. Also, the United States has a 
relationship with Saudi Arabia and nuclear technology transfer in the future is a 
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possibility. It is important from a policymaker standpoint to be able to somehow 
measure the impact giving the Saudis certain nuclear technologies would have on their 
likelihood of acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 Syria was chosen because it is another Middle Eastern country that has been 
interested in nuclear technology. Due to their rivalry with Israel, there is substantial 
international consequence if they were to acquire nuclear weaponry. 
 Myanmar was chosen because it is in a slightly different part of the world and 
has near the bottom of the metrics. This nation has interest in nuclear technology and has 
possible connections with North Korea. 
 Finally, Japan was selected due to its nuclear advancement. The purpose was to 
see the impact of technology transfer on a nation with sufficient nuclear capabilities.  
IV.B. Motivations of Countries 
 The Freeman network was driven by motivations leading to intentions which in 
turn led to pathways. A spreadsheet was made in Microsoft Excel whereby the user 
could relatively rank a list of motivations a state would have for acquiring a nuclear 
weapon. In addition to motivations, there were also intentions for deliverability, yield, 
and number of nuclear weapons. Each intention is assigned a probability for a given 
motivations that could be adjusted. This value, designated    , represents the probability 
that motivation m causes the state to pursue intention i. Each motivation was assigned a 
weight, which is inserted by the user. The weights can be any value from zero to infinity 
and the user is to assign them relative to one another. For instance, if one motivation is 
twice as likely the reason a given nation is pursuing the bomb as another motivation then 
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its value would be weighted twice as large. The weights for a given nation, wm, are 
normalized as shown in Eq. (13). 
   
  
   
 
 
                                                          (13) 
The normalized weights were then combined with the probability that a given motivation 
causes a state to pursue a given intention by Eq. (14). This equation yields the 
probability that i is the intention of the state. 
       
                                                          (14) 
This attribute aggregation method was chosen because it went to zero if any of its inputs 
are zero unlike an additive aggregation but it is not as stringent as straight 
multiplication.7 The intention values for delivery, yield, and number calculated in the 
above manner were inserted into the Bayesian network. 
 The next step in this work was to come up with motivations for the above 
selected countries and give each motivation a relative weight. The following motivations 
for nations who have sought or have considered seeking nuclear weapons were inferred 
from several sources.11,12,17,33,34,35 In order to improve the accuracy and relative ranking 
of the motivations, expert advice was elicited from faculty and graduate students at 
Texas A&M‟s Nuclear Science and Security Policy Institute (NSSPI) in the form of a 
survey.  
Soviet Union Motivations 
 The Soviet Union‟s motivations for developing a nuclear weapon were born after 
witnessing the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The Soviets saw it necessary to 
develop the bomb to counter the United States. To a lesser degree the Soviet Union may 
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have been motivated by the intimidation factor it would provide to those nations that got 
in the way of the spread of communism. 
 
TABLE VII 
The Soviet Union Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack From Nuclear Adversary 
 
4 
Seek Military Superiority 2 
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals 
 
1 
 
 
 Deterring an attack from the United States was weighted the most important 
factor. The Soviets were seeking military superiority for defense and to project power to 
spread communist interests. Intimidating non-nuclear rivals was another tactic that also 
served those purposes. Table VII shows the Soviet motivational profile. 
French Motivations 
 After losing to Germany in World War II, the nation of France had great 
incentive to prove itself once again as a major world power. France needed to reestablish 
their credibility as one of the Big Four European victors and the development of a 
nuclear weapon seemed to be necessary to achieve that.33 Another event that further 
propagated the belief that their image as world power was slipping away was the French 
Army‟s defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.33 The final tipping point, however, was the 
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Suez Crisis. During this event, Israel invaded Egypt and was backed up by Britain and 
France. The United States completely opposed the operation and the three nations were 
forced to halt the operation. France took this as a sign that they could not count on the 
United States. 
 
TABLE VIII 
The French Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Enhance General International Status 4 
Enhance Bargaining Position w/in Alliance 
w/ Nuclear Powers 
3 
Rise to Global Power Status 
 
3 
Demonstrate National Viability 
 
2 
Intimidate Non-Nuclear rivals 1 
Assert political independence 1 
 
 
 The international embarrassments the French faced leading to feelings of slipping 
from consideration as a world power makes the enhancement of general international 
status the key motivator for France. France felt that joining the nuclear club would put 
them in a better bargaining position with the other nuclear powers, especially when it 
came to incidents like the Suez Crisis. Such a position would allow them to regain their 
global power status. 
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 Regaining global power status also tied in with the French need to feel more 
independent of the United States. The whole concept of de Gaulle‟s Force de Frappe was 
to have a striking force that was without any strategic consideration of the United 
States.33 National viability, especially on the issue of nuclear defense, was another 
motivation. To a lesser degree, the ability to intimidate non-nuclear rivals also had a role 
in the French nuclear decision. The issues France had been having with countries such as 
Algeria, Vietnam, and Egypt may have been resolved in a more favorable manner had 
France had its own nuclear arsenal to project power. Table  VIII shows the French 
motivations. 
Israeli Motivations 
 Since its birth, the nation of Israel has been at war or amidst high tensions in the 
Middle East. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 indicated that the region was hostile to the 
Jews inhabiting. In this conflict, the nations of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
and Yemen attacked Israel and were defeated. Israel‟s then Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion anticipated future conflicts.17 Deterring a second Arab invasion was believed to 
be near impossible since the Arab world had more resources and a greater population.17 
The motivation for obtaining nuclear weapons began with the need to redress the 
overwhelming conventional asymmetry the Arab world posed. Israel‟s non-nuclear 
rivals needed to be too intimidated to attack again and nuclear weapons seemed like the 
necessary deterrent. 
 It was during the midst of the Cold War that the Israeli bomb was being desired. 
The United States and the Soviet Union both had reasons why they did not want Israel 
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obtaining the weapon, which in turn provided added motivation for the development of 
the bomb. From United States perspective at the time, there was no existing rivalry 
between the U.S. and the Arab nations, which caused some U.S. officials to speculate 
that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, they would not only be less subject to American 
influence but might also be in a position to force the United States to intervene on their 
behalf in a crisis.17 After the Suez Crisis in which the French, British, and Israelis tried 
to attack Egypt, the Israelis were left feeling that they could no longer count on their 
once reliable American ally.33 If Israel had nuclear weapons, they would enhance their 
bargaining position with the United States. 
 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was worried because they felt that a nuclear 
Israel would constrain their ability to project conventional military power in the region 
and reduce the effectiveness of Moscow‟s coercive diplomacy on behalf of the Arab 
states and against Israel.17 This geopolitical situation added to the final motivation seen 
in Table IX of deterring regional intervention by a superpower, namely the Soviet 
Union. 
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TABLE IX 
The Israeli Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 4 
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals 4 
Enhance Bargaining Position w/in Alliance 
w/ Nuclear Powers 
1 
Deter Regional Intervention by Superpower 1 
 
 
 The notable motive was the overwhelming conventional threat posed by the 
coalition of Arab states.11 The redressing of conventional military asymmetry and the 
intimidation of non-nuclear rivals was the more pressing issue for Israel whereas the 
enhancement of bargaining position and the deterrent of regional intervention were 
secondary motivations. The former two motivations are weighted three times more than 
the latter two because due to this reason. 
South African Motivations 
 The roots of South Africa‟s nuclear weapon ambitions begin in the 1960s with 
the formation of the Organization of African Unity, an economic pact that isolated South 
Africa on the continent.11 South Africa was additionally isolated on the global front from 
the United Nations trade embargo. Around 1974, the Portuguese colonies of Angola and 
Mozambique gained independence and joined the other African states allied against 
South Africa.11 In addition, Cuban and Soviet troops were placed in the region.11 South 
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Africa began to fear a major attack from the Soviet Union and strongly pushed the 
nuclear program forward in 1975.35  
 
TABLE X 
The South African Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Seek Military Superiority 
 
3 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 2 
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals 2 
 
 
 Several motives can be listed for South Africa‟s pursuit of nuclear weaponry. 
The most important was for South Africa to have had military superiority in a region of 
the world that was allied against them. South Africa had to redress a conventional 
military asymmetry between the African states and the perceived threat from the Soviet 
Union. Finally, they felt a need to intimidate the African states that did not possess such 
weapons. Table X shows these motivations. 
Indian Motivations 
 India has long had border disputes with its neighbors China and Pakistan. Since 
the British left India, the border had not been clearly defined.33 In 1962, the Indians lost 
a one month war to the Chinese that caused resentment from India that is still around 
today and a determination within China to support India‟s enemies.33 
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 India has always had a desire for great power status.11,33 This desire coupled with 
China‟s detonation of an atomic bomb in 1964 was the tipping point for their motivation 
to seek a nuclear weapon.  
 
TABLE XI 
The Indian Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack From Nuclear Adversary 
 
4 
Rise to Global Power Status 
 
3 
Enhance General International Status 2 
Demonstrate National Viability 2 
 
 
 Deterring another attack from China is weighted the highest because India‟s 
defeat by them resonated so deeply. The rise to global power status is a close second due 
to the Indian mentality. India has an urge to enhance their overall international status and 
to demonstrate their viability as a powerful country. The Indian motivational profile is in 
Table XI. 
Pakistani Motivations 
 The impetus for the Pakistani nuclear bomb came after Pakistan was soundly 
beaten by India in less than two weeks. The defeat made it clear that there was a serious 
conventional military asymmetry. It was this incident that motivated A.Q. Kahn to start 
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initiating his quest to give Pakistan the bomb.34 China helped solidify the project by 
giving Pakistan a nuclear weapon design in the early 1980s.17 This move by the Chinese 
can also be seen as acting to counter India‟s development of a nuclear weapon. 
 
TABLE XII 
The Pakistani Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack From Nuclear Adversary 
 
4 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 3 
 
 
Pakistan wanted to be able to deter the nuclear armed India. Given the crushing defeat at 
the hands of the Indians, Pakistan needed to redress the conventional military 
asymmetry. These two motivations and their weighs are shown in Table XII. 
Iraqi Motivations 
 Before the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq was motivated by several factors. The first 
motivation was the nuclear capability that Israel possessed.  When considering the 
broader region, India‟s development of the bomb in 1974 was another motivating factor. 
Iraq also needed such a weapon to alleviate the defense burden that was occurring in the 
late sixties and early seventies. In 1982, Iraq lost a war with Iran and it became clear that 
there was a strong conventional asymmetry between not just Israel, but also Iran.  The 
motivational profile of Iraq is shown in Table XIII. 
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TABLE XIII 
The Iraqi Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 
 
3 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 2 
Reduce Economic Defense Burden 1 
 
 
Iranian Motivations 
 Over the past decade, the statements made by the government of Iran indicate 
that the nuclear armed state of Israel is a prime motivator for Iran‟s nuclear motivations. 
In addition to this motive, Iran also seeks to keep the United States from interfering. 
 
TABLE XIV 
The Iranian Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 
 
4 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 3 
Deter Regional Intervention by a 
Superpower 
3 
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 Deterring an attack from their enemy, Israel, is the main reason behind their 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran also needs to redress the conventional military 
asymmetry that exists between them and their rivals in the Middle East. Deterring 
United States intervention in the region is also ranked equivalently because of the 
strategic importance it holds for Iran. The motivations and weights are shown in Table 
XIV. 
Swedish Motivations 
 In Sweden, atomic research was conducted by a company that was explicitly 
connected to the defense ministry and it is also known that decisions were made by 
cabinet-level officials to develop dual-use technology with high potential utility for any 
future nuclear weapons program.12 To deter an attack from a nuclear adversary was the 
main motivation. Table XV shows the motivations of Sweden. 
 
TABLE XV 
Swedish Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 
 
2 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 1 
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The main nuclear adversary was the Soviet Union. There was obviously a serious 
conventional military asymmetry between the Swedes and the Soviets that needed to be 
redressed.  
Saudi Arabian Motivations 
 The ranking of Saudi Arabian motivations was done by assessing the present-day 
situation and considering the potential motivating factors that could drive them to 
developing a nuclear weapon. The two motivating factors that were decided upon were 
to deter an attack from a nuclear adversary and to go nuclear before their rival. The main 
nuclear rival for Saudi Arabia is Israel. Nuclear-armed Israel has not proved to be 
sufficient enough of a motivation thus far but it is definitely of concern for the Arab 
nation. The other motivation is to go nuclear before rival. A rival that is pursuing nuclear 
weapons is the nation of Iran. The need for assurance of security in the face of Iran 
prompted the largest arms deal in history between the United States and Saudi Arabia.36 
The arms deal was largely done willingly on the part of the United States to deter Saudi 
Arabia from developing a nuclear weapon. The relative rankings of these two are shown 
in Table XVI. 
 
TABLE XVI 
Potential Saudi Arabian Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Go Nuclear Before Rival 2 
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 1 
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Syrian Motivations 
 The only tenable motivation that Syria would have for developing a nuclear 
weapon, shown in Table XVII, would be to deter an attack from Israel. Syria is another 
Arab nation that has had a long standing feud with Israel.  
 
TABLE XVII 
Potential Syrian Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 2 
 
 
Myanmar Motivations 
 There are several potential motivations that Myanmar could have for wanting to 
acquire a nuclear weapon. Unlike other nations, there is no one overwhelming 
motivation but rather a list of several that may equally contribute to the desire to attain a 
bomb. Given the fact that Myanmar is ruled by a military junta, the development of the 
bomb to increase military morale was ranked slightly higher than the rest. While they are 
a military junta, if they had to fight a war they would have a conventional military 
disadvantage. Given the importance on military projection of power in this country, this 
factor may play into the motivations. Myanmar perceived that North Korea gained a 
greater voice in the international community with their pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
they show signs of wanting to emulate this. 
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 Due to the human rights violations in Myanmar, it is also possible that their 
weapons program might be intended to divert that attention. Another possibility is their 
desire to show the world that they are capable of such a feat, again giving them a greater 
voice on the world‟s stage. These motivations are shown in Table XVIII. 
 
TABLE XVIII 
Potential Myanmar Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Increase Military Morale 2 
Acquire Position in International Forums 1 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 1 
Demonstrate National Viability 1 
Divert Domestic Attention 1 
 
 
Japan  
 As with Syria, the only potential motivation Japan, shown in Table XIX, would 
have would be to deter an attack from a nuclear adversary, namely China. 
 
 
 
 
 61 
TABLE XIX 
Potential Japanese Nuclear Motivations 
Motivation Value 
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 2 
 
 
Expert Elicitation 
 In addition to ranking motivations based upon information found in a number of 
literary sources pertaining to nuclear weapons programs, it was decided to elicit expert 
advice in the form of a survey. The survey sought expert advice for the nuclear weapon 
motivations of Russia prior to 1949, France in the 1950s, Israel in the 1960s, South 
Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s, India before 1974, Pakistan after the return of 
A.Q. Kahn in 1976, Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War, and Iran from 2000 to the present. 
Seventeen faculty and graduate students took the survey and the results were compared 
with the motivations in the tables above. The results from the faculty and students were 
averaged. To best reconcile the rankings based off of the literature review and those of 
the survey of experts an average was performed. The averaged values were rounded to 
the nearest decimal and then utilized to generate intentions to insert into the Bayesian 
network. The results of this survey in addition to the actual values used to generate 
intentions are in Appendix B. 
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IV.C. Verification with Historical Proliferation Cases 
Russia 
 Of the selected countries that were studied through the network, the Soviet 
Union‟s development of a nuclear weapon came first historically. The USSR first 
detonated a nuclear weapon on August 29th of 1949. The weapon was based off of the 
U.S. plutonium-implosion design and it had a yield of 20kt.37 Fig. 12 shows the weapon 
pathway for the Soviet Union starting in 1939 and finishing with the successful 
detonation of a plutonium implosion weapon in 1949. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. The weapon pathways for the Soviet Union. 
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Fig. 13. The enrichment pathways for the Soviet Union. 
 
 The first decision that initiated the pathway towards the bomb came in mid 
October of 1940. The Presidium, which was a Soviet government institution, allocated 
funds for 1.5 metric tons of uranium compounds per year and to buy up the industry‟s 
supplies of uranium salts, which totaled about 300 kg.37 In the network the uranium mine 
node was then turned on. The relative probabilities for both the HEU gun and the HEU 
implosion weapon increase to the mid-teens, while the probability for plutonium 
implosion remains negligible. The enrichment pathway begins to lean heavily toward 
gaseous centrifuge, with this choice increasing to 57%, as seen in Fig. 13. The next 
enrichment path that is not negligible is gaseous diffusion which increases to nearly 
20%.  The next historical piece of evidence to the network is the addition of UF6 after 
the Soviet biogeochemical lab begins preparing for use in separation.38 The addition of 
UF6 does not change the weapon pathways by much but it does increase gaseous 
centrifuge to 73% and gaseous diffusion to 23.7%. In 1943 the Russians began to request 
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UCl4, an indicator that they may be looking into the electromagnetic isotope separation 
enrichment method. The activation of UCl4 increases the probability of that path to 
nearly 13% while decreasing gaseous centrifuge to 65%. Gaseous diffusion decreases 
only marginally to 21%. 
 Later in 1943, the decision was made to focus on gaseous diffusion over other 
types of enrichment methods. By turning on the energy requirements node that is 
necessary for this path, the pathway for gaseous diffusion jumps to 73% while gaseous 
centrifuge decreases to about 21%. The rest remain drop down to negligible values.  
The Russian spy Klaus Fuchs was transferred to Los Alamos and was able to transfer 
knowledge about the plutonium implosion weapon. Throughout the year 1945, Fuchs 
was able to give to the Soviets information about the polonium initiator, the tamper, and 
the high explosive lenses.38 By turning on the respective nodes, the HEU implosion path 
jumps up to 71.4%. 
 The decision was made by Stalin to pursue the plutonium implosion weapon. In 
1947, production began on a reactor and a reprocessing facility. The precipitation 
method, which involves the chemistry behind the reprocessing of plutonium, was 
perfected. The activation of this node caused a jump in the likelihood of the plutonium 
weapon path to 4.33%.  By 1948 the reprocessing facility was complete. The activation 
of the reprocessing node caused the same path to increase to 16.7% at the expense of the 
HEU implosion path. The tipping point came when the reactor, known as Chelyabinsk-
40 started to produce plutonium. The plutonium node was turned on causing the 
plutonium weapon pathway to drastically increase to 72.1% while the HEU implosion 
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path drops to a negligible 0.15%. The weapon was tested in 1949 and when the testing 
node is turned on the network indicates that it was indeed a plutonium weapon. 
 It is interesting to note that the same nodes that were causing the plutonium 
weapon path to increase were causing the enrichment pathways to decrease. This makes 
intuitive sense since HEU is not needed for a plutonium weapon and hence if that path is 
pursued the uranium enrichment paths should decrease. Even the gaseous diffusion 
pathway decreased to 17.8% once the plutonium was obtained. In 1951, however, the 
path increases again as the plant was successfully completed and operational. This 
behavior of the network brings to light two important points. The first is that due to the 
nature of the Bayesian network being normalized to one, an increase in one path 
necessitates a decrease in another. This behavior does not allow parallel paths to be 
shown in the network. Second, the results the network delivers is in fact the most likely 
path in a given instant of time. The network is not to be used as a predictive tool but 
rather one that gives a probability assessment at a given date. 
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France 
 
 
Fig. 14. The weapon pathways for France. 
 
 
Fig. 15. The enrichment pathways for France. 
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 French interest in a nuclear weapon began after World War II. A domestic 
uranium mine was discovered near the end of 1948 in La Crouzille, Limousin, and the 
Autun region. The uranium mine node was activated making the most likely enrichment 
pathway gaseous centrifuge at 25.8%. In 1956 the domestic reactor node was added 
when the plutonium production reactor at Marcoule went critical.37 The addition of the 
reactor node caused the plutonium weapon pathway to increase to 8.51% as seen in Fig 
14. Given the French intentions, the network still was giving non-negligible probabilities 
for the enrichment pathways. The non-negligible enrichment pathways were keeping the 
weapons pathways for HEU gun and implosion types at 8.72% and 10.2% respectively. 
In 1958 the plutonium reprocessing facility became operational and later that year they 
begin to produce plutonium at 0.67 lbs per day.37 The activation of the reprocessing and 
plutonium nodes essentially dropped all of the enrichment paths to zero, as seen in Fig. 
15, along with the HEU gun and implosion paths while the plutonium weapon path 
increased to 21.6%. The weapons test itself occurred on the February 13th and was in 
fact a 70kt plutonium implosion weapon.37 Turning on the testing stage node increased 
this path to 100%, hence accurately describing the outcome. 
 In the French case, only the large technologies such as the reactor and 
reprocessing facility were activated and no smaller weapons components. Until the 
testing node was activated, the likelihood for the weapons path was slightly above 20%. 
This indicates that the large facilities contribute, but to not drastically increase the belief 
in weapon acquisition. Inputting the large-scale technologies show a definite start down 
a weapons path, but the belief is relatively low due to lack of weapons components. The 
 68 
above result demonstrates that the network behaves as it should while providing insight 
into the degree to which large facilities contribute to the likelihood of taking certain 
weapons paths. This behavior is to be seen in the examples below too. 
Israel 
 
 
Fig. 16. The weapon pathways for Israel. 
 
 
Fig. 17. The enrichment pathways for Israel. 
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 The Israeli weapons program was given a tangible impetus in 1960 when Israel 
received 50kg of 90% enriched HEU from the United States intended for use in a 
research reactor.39 The HEU node was turned on in the network. It is interesting to note 
that due to the structure of the network, the activation of the HEU also caused the 
enrichment paths to increase, the greatest one of these being by gaseous centrifuge. As 
would be expected, the weapons paths for both types of HEU bombs increased with the 
reception of the HEU material. The gun type increased to 16% and the implosion type 
increased to 9.76% as seen in Fig. 16. 
 The collaboration with the French significantly helped the Israelis. The French 
need for Israeli computer expertise prompted caused them to trust the Israelis with very 
sensitive knowledge. It has even been said that when the French detonated their first 
implosion weapon in February of 1960, it implied the birth of two nuclear powers 
because the collaboration with Israel was so great.40 The unrestricted access to the 
implosion test on that day in addition to the detailed entwinement of the countries since 
the French began their pursuit of the implosion weapon sufficiently implied that the 
Israelis possessed implosion knowledge. The implosion knowledge node was turned on 
making the HEU implosion path surpass the gun type path by a comparison of 17.8% to 
14%. 
 At the end of December 1963, the Dimona reactor purchased by the Israelis from 
the French went into operation. This node was turned on but does not have any effect on 
the weapons pathways.  Less than a year later the plutonium separation facility was 
completed. The reprocessing node was turned on without effect. In early 1965 the first 
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plutonium starts to be extracted.37 The plutonium node was turned on which causes the 
plutonium implosion weapon pathway to increase to 14.4%. This increase puts the 
plutonium weapon pathway on par with the HEU implosion weapon which dropped to 
14.5%.  The gun type also dropped to 11.4%. The activation of the plutonium node also 
causes the enrichment paths to decrease to negligible values as seen in Fig. 17. These 
numbers make intuitive sense since Israel at this point had access to both types of special 
nuclear material and knowledge of implosion weapons. The way the network is 
structured, the plutonium implosion weapon pathway did not increase with the reactor or 
the reprocessing facility until the plutonium node was activated because the HEU node 
was already activated. Once one of the special nuclear material nodes are activated, it 
gives the network a strong bias towards the type of weapon that utilizes that material 
until the other material is also activated. This behavior of the network is also the same 
reason that the enrichment paths decrease as more nodes associated with the plutonium 
weapon are activated. 
 In 1966 the Israelis had produced enough plutonium for a weapon. The 
plutonium pit was added causing the plutonium implosion weapon pathway to increase 
to 15.7%, slightly edging out the HEU implosion weapon path which was at 14.9%. 
These numbers are low but that is because there is a lack of evidence of direct of 
domestically developed weapons packages for the implosion weapons. 
 Unlike the other cases, the Israeli case does not clearly indicate one path over the 
other. The lack of indication of one path over the other is due to the activation of both 
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the HEU and plutonium nodes, and a lack of information regarding other weapons 
components the Israelis acquired. 
South Africa 
 
 
Fig. 18. The weapon pathways for South Africa. 
 
 
Fig. 19. The enrichment pathways for South Africa. 
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 The first step in South Africa‟s program was the domestic uranium mine 
discovery at West Rand‟s Consolidated Mines near Johannesburg.35 At this point all of 
the weapons paths are around 7%, as seen in Fig. 18,  making it unclear what is the most 
likely path. Based on the intentions, the leading pathway for enrichment was gaseous 
centrifuge at 36%. The second highest percentage pathway was aerodynamic isotope 
separation at 17%. The next significant step in the program was the reactor Safari-1 
given to South Africa by the United States in 1965. As shown in Fig. 19, turning on the 
domestic reactor node decreased the gaseous centrifuge to 24.5% and aerodynamic to 
11.9%. 
 In 1970, South Africa began to do research with ultracentrifuge technology.40 
The high speed motor node was activated as a result of this as these are an essential 
component to this technology. This activation caused a spike in the gaseous centrifuge 
pathway to 78.5% while the other pathways dropped to negligible amounts. This also 
caused the HEU weapons to separate themselves from the plutonium weapon by 
increasing to the early teens while the plutonium weapon dropped to 1.84%. 
 Four years later, the enrichment paths take another turn when a government-
owned German firm named Steinkohlen Elektrizitaia AG (STEAG) gave Becker jet 
nozzle technology to South Africa.40 The aerodynamic component nodes were turned on 
as a result of the technology transfer and the aerodynamic pathway increased to 77%. 
The other enrichment pathways dropped to minuscule values. The weapon pathway 
percentages did not significantly alter as a result of this, the bias still being towards the 
HEU paths. Further bolstering the aerodynamic enrichment path, the UF6 node was 
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turned on when in 1975 the South Africans opened a production plant in Pelindaba.40 
The activation of the UF6 node resulted in the aerodynamic enrichment path increasing 
to 94.3% while causing the gun type weapon to increase to 14.9% and the HEU 
implosion weapon to increase to 15.3%. In 1977 the South Africans obtained tungsten 
from Rhodesia, Zaire, and Zambia and they gained expertise in internal ballistics, 
igniters, and propellants.35 A gun test without HEU was conducted later that year. The 
gun test node was activated resulting in an increase in the HEU gun type path to 99.4%. 
It was clear at this point in history that an implosion weapon was not being sought and 
the network accurately reflected this by decreasing the implosion weapons to zero. 
 The South African case demonstrated how the network portrays a clear decision 
for a given path being made as a result of a technology transfer. In 1974 the acquisition 
of the German aerodynamic technology caused them to take that enrichment path. The 
network shows this by increasing the aerodynamic path drastically while all other paths 
drop to negligible values. This is a case in which the normalized nature of the network 
that adds to one path at the expense of another lucidly demonstrates the strong impact of 
a technology transfer on pathway choices.   
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India 
 
Fig. 20. The weapon pathways for India. 
 
 
Fig. 21. The enrichment pathways for India. 
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 In 1955, Canada offered to give India an unsafeguarded 40MW research reactor 
on the condition that they would use it for peaceful purposes.41 The reactor was called 
CIRIUS and burned natural uranium fuel. The reactor went critical in the summer of 
1960. The largest jump in the weapon pathway as a result of the activation of the reactor 
node was the plutonium implosion weapon pathway which increased to 17.1% as seen in 
Fig. 20. The HEU gun and implosion paths were around 4% and 5% respectively. The 
enrichment paths remained low, the highest being the gaseous centrifuge at 13.8%, 
shown in Fig. 21. 
 The next node activated was the reprocessing capability after the first spent fuel 
from the CIRIUS reactor entered the plant at Trombay.33 The plant was based off of the 
PUREX process and blueprints were supplied by a U.S. firm albeit Indian engineers 
modified them during construction.40 The largest difference caused by the addition of the 
reprocessing node was a 1.5% increase in the plutonium implosion weapon pathway. 
Subsequent to the initiation of the reprocessing plant, plutonium began to be separated. 
The plutonium node was activated and there was a further increase of the plutonium 
weapon pathway to 24.5%. The plutonium node activation also caused the gun type and 
HEU implosion pathways to drop to zero. 
 In 1967 a scientist named Chidambaram was asked to develop the equation of 
state for plutonium in order to determine how much high explosive is necessary to 
compress the plutonium to the necessary density for the implosion weapon to function 
properly.37 Shortly after Chidambaram begins to recruit other Indian scientists and 
engineers to design the components of the chemical high explosive device that would be 
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needed.37 This was sufficient evidence to imply that implosion knowledge was being 
obtained at this time. The implosion knowledge node was turned on causing the 
plutonium pathway to further increase to 37.9%. All of the enrichment pathways are 
miniscule at this point in time again showing that when one path is being followed, 
either plutonium or uranium, there is devaluation in the nodes contributing to the other. 
 By 1973 a non-nuclear chemical explosives test is performed in the forests of 
Andrha Pradesh.40 The explosives package node was activated and the plutonium 
pathway increased to 65.5%. A year later the Indians executed their first test of a nuclear 
weapon. If the testing stage was activated at this point in the network, it is obvious that 
the weapon pathway was the plutonium implosion route. The network accurately showed 
a steady increase in the plutonium path and essentially the null case for the enrichment 
paths. 
 Similar to the previous cases, the reactor and reprocessing nodes increased the 
plutonium pathway to the upper teens in value. Once these nodes were activated, the 
pathway greatly increased with the addition of the implosion knowledge and the 
explosives package. This implies that the sensitivity of a pathway to other nodes greatly 
increases once foundational technologies such as reactors and reprocessing facilities are 
activated. 
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Pakistan 
 
 
Fig. 22. The weapon pathways for Pakistan. 
 
 
Fig. 23. The enrichment pathways for Pakistan. 
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 The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology was established in 
1961 and two years later a 5MW research reactor and reprocessing facility were 
opened.37 The network reflected these installations by increasing the plutonium weapon 
pathway to 14%. The highest percentage at this point for the enrichment pathways was a 
miniscule 11% for gaseous centrifuge. The next milestone in the program was when 
Canada agreed to give Pakistan a 137MW heavy water reactor called KANUPP. This 
became operational in 1972. What is also significant about this year is the desire 
expressed by President Bhutto of having a bomb in three years.37 As seen in Fig. 22, 
there was a spike in the plutonium route in the year 1972. However, it dips down in 1974 
and the HEU bomb paths begin to increase. Several key historical events happened in 
that two year period to explain that transition. After the reactor was opened, Pakistan 
contacted the French to buy a large-scale reprocessing facility.42 Pakistan went as far as 
signing a contract for a plant. However, in 1974, as noted above, the Indians tested their 
first nuclear weapon. The Indian test caused an overall tightening of export controls. At 
around this same time, A.Q. Khan returned to Pakistan and proposed to Pakistani 
officials an initiation of a uranium enrichment program. The program, called Project 
706, was soon initiated and proved to be more promising than the plutonium-
reprocessing route.42 The associated activations caused the plutonium weapon path to 
drop near zero and the HEU paths to increase to around 12%. The necessary components 
for centrifuges begin to be collected and it is discernible from Fig. 23 that the 
enrichment paths spike up in 1974, the greatest being gaseous centrifuge at 35.6%. In the 
early 1980s Khan procured 6000 tubes of maraging steel from the Netherlands. The 
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maraging steel and high strength tube nodes are activated and it is evident from the 
percentage of 99.9% that the enrichment pathway chosen and being followed from this 
year onward is gaseous centrifuge. This decision affected the weapon pathway by 
decreasing the plutonium weapon route to zero and increasing the HEU gun and 
implosion types to 26.6% and 28.9% respectively. 
 Also in the early 1980s, Pakistani interested in reprocessing revived. There were 
reports of a Swiss company assisting Pakistani in developing reprocessing technology.40 
Pakistan also established two facilities, an experimental and plutonium extraction 
plant.37 The plutonium node now had a probability of 14%, increasing the plutonium 
weapon pathway to 5.6%. 
 Further assistance from the A.Q. Khan network came when a UF6 plant was 
established in the first years of the 1980s decade. The plant parts were transferred piece 
by piece from a West German company.37 The UF6 node was turned on and there was a 
miniscule decrease in the plutonium weapon pathway and a miniscule increase in the 
HEU weapon pathways since the centrifuge pathway was so high to begin with.  
For the year 1982, the HEU node was activated because there were enough centrifuges 
to make six bombs per year. This activation caused the plutonium pathway to drop to 
zero again and the HEU gun and implosion paths increased to 26.7% and 29% 
respectively. 
 In 1984, the program made a decisive step in the implosion direction when a high 
explosive device was tested. The explosives package node was activated and the HEU 
implosion pathway increases to 67.4% while the gun type drops to a mere 4.41%. A few 
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years later, a non-nuclear implosion device is tested. The weapons package was now 
activated and the HEU implosion path continued to increase to 74.9%. The gun type path 
joined the plutonium path at a negligible amount near zero.  
 In 1987 oscilloscopes were purchased.34 The activation of these nodes increased 
the HEU implosion pathway to 96.1%. The next node turned on was the HEU pit after 
U.S. intelligence reported that Pakistan was machining the uranium metal into bomb 
cores.37 
 In the 1990s, China helped Pakistan with its reprocessing plant at Chasma. The 
reprocessing capability node was turned on as a result of this. This placed both 
implosion weapon paths on equal par at around 50%. 
 The enrichment graph clearly shows the decision point to pursue gaseous 
centrifuge upon A.Q. Khan‟s return. The weapon paths graphed in Fig. 22 show a state 
that has changed direction in its pursuit of the bomb. The Pakistani case shows the 
network‟s ability to demonstrate changes in paths.   
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Iraq 
 
 
Fig. 24. The weapon pathways for Iraq. 
 
 
Fig. 25. The enrichment pathways for Iraq. 
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 In 1967, the 2MW research reactor supplied by the Soviets to Iraq went critical.40 
The reactor node was turned on but the initial pathways for both weapon and enrichment 
remained low. In 1974 Iraq found a uranium mine near Al Qaim which was located near 
the Syrian border.37 The leading enrichment pathway at this point was gaseous 
centrifuge at 22%. Italy built Iraq a radiochemistry lab with three lead-shielded hot cells 
capable of reprocessing plutonium in 1976.17 The reprocessing capability node was 
activated causing the enrichment paths to decrease to miniscule values. The only non-
negligible weapon pathway at this point was plutonium implosion which was at 6.31% 
as seen in Fig. 24. 
 France agreed to build Iraq a 70MW reactor. During the construction process 
however, the reactor was destroyed by Israeli fighter jets.37 The reactor node was de-
activated as a result of this. The plutonium weapon route drops to near zero as a result. 
 In 1982, research and development began on a UCl4 plant.40 The UCl4 node was 
turned on as a result of this exploratory work. The network responds by showing that 
electromagnetic enrichment was the most likely path at 30.9%, as seen in Fig. 25. 
Gaseous diffusion also entered the realm of possibilities for Iraq in the early eighties. By 
1985 progress was made with the barrier material for the gaseous diffusion process with 
special emphasis on the compressor, diffuser, and heat exchange design.40 The progress 
prompted the activation of the compressor and energy requirements node. As a result of 
this, gaseous diffusion increased from 6.49% to 16%. The electromagnetic pathway 
decreased below 8%.  
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 The electromagnetic pathway rebounded to 52.2% when the design work for the 
EMIS production phase was finalized. Iraq was planning to have 70 R120 separators for 
the production of 20% enriched uranium and 20 R60 separators for the production of 
93% enriched uranium. The separator node was activated as a result of this. 
 In August of 1987, Iraqi scientist Khidhir Hamza went to Germany to purchase a 
list of bomb components and $120 million dollar deal was signed. One of the mentioned 
items on the list was an x-ray flash camera that has the ability to penetrate the explosive 
plume of compression charges.40 By activating this node, the HEU implosion weapon 
pathway increased to 40.1%. This did not affect the enrichment paths. 
 The next node activation that affected the enrichment paths was the high strength 
tubes when, in 1988, Iraq was successful in manufacturing a barrier tube suitable for 
operation in UF6.40 This was the point in the timeline where the gaseous centrifuge 
pathway began to win out. The gaseous centrifuge pathway increased to 79.3% at the 
expense of the EMIS route. In 1989, Iraq cancelled its gaseous diffusion project.36 The 
nodes associated with the gaseous diffusion path were turned off and the gaseous 
centrifuge route increased to 83.6%. The gaseous centrifuge route continues to increase 
when Iraq obtained twenty-five pieces of maraging steel, 19 of them used for centrifuge 
performs. About one year later in 1990, they obtain 20 carbon fiber centrifuge rotors. 
The carbon fiber rotor node was turned on. By this time the gaseous centrifuge path is at 
98.3%.  Later that year UF6 started to be run through the centrifuges. The UF6 node was 
activated and the pathway for gaseous centrifuge was at 99.8%.40 
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 In 1990 it became apparent that Iraq was in fact pursuing the HEU implosion 
path. Iraq had the design details for a beryllium-polonium neutron initiator that would be 
placed at the center of the bomb.40 The design included a reflector/tamper that was made 
of natural uranium. The according nodes were activated and the HEU implosion path 
increased to 66.9%. 
 Later that same year, eight electromagnetic isotope separators began operation. 
They were only able to produce hundreds of grams of uranium with a maximum 
enrichment of 7.2%.40 The network responded to the activation of the rest of the 
electromagnetic nodes by increasing its percentage to 32.6% at the expense of the 
gaseous centrifuge pathway. The network was able to show the oscillations between two 
competing enrichment technologies. 
 Finally, In January of 1991, Iraq specified the exact dimensions of the explosive 
lens.40 The explosive lens node was activated and the activation increased the HEU 
implosion weapon pathway to 68%.  
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Iran 
 
 
Fig. 26. The weapon pathways for Iran. 
 
 
Fig. 27. The enrichment pathways for Iran. 
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 In 1981, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced the 
discovery of four uranium mines.40 The domestic mine node was activated and the most 
likely enrichment path was gaseous centrifuge at 10.3%. China gave Iran a small 
calutron in 1984. This technology transfer increased the electromagnetic isotope 
separation path to 44.6%. 
 As a result of the A.Q. Khan network, Iran in 1987 received drawings and 
specifications for a complete gaseous centrifuge plants including components such as the 
electrical drive equipment. The high speed motors node was activated causing the 
gaseous centrifuge path to increase to 76.4% at the expense of the electromagnetic path 
which dropped to 13.6%. During these early oscillations in the enrichment paths, the 
HEU paths have increased to the mid-teens in percentage while the plutonium path 
remained near zero. 
 The next node that was activated was the pulse generator when in 1987 two 
Iranian nationals illegally exported this item along with electronic equipment.40 As 
expected, this activation had no impact on the enrichment paths but it did increase the 
HEU weapon paths to about 25% as seen in Fig. 26. 
 The Chinese delivered the electromagnets to Iran in 1989 and this pushed the 
electromagnetic path ahead of the centrifuge path by a comparison of 67.8% to 28.7%, 
as seen in Fig. 27. However, in 1991 the Iranians received balancing machines, a 
component in gaseous centrifuge technology, from Germany.30 The activations of the 
balancing machine node made the most likely path gaseous centrifuge by increasing this 
path to 64.8% while the electromagnetic path decreased to 33.5%.  However, in 1995 it 
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was reported that the Chinese installed a calutron system.40 More of the electromagnetic 
components were added and again the electromagnetic pathway increased to its highest 
percentage of 88.3%, shown in Fig. 27. At this point it seemed like electromagnetic 
enrichment was the path to be pursued. The most likely enrichment path switches again 
between these two choices when in 1996 it is discovered that Iran imported anhydrous 
fluoride, a chemical used to make uranium hexafluoride, from China and Russia. China 
was also helping them build a UF6 conversion plant.40 The UF6 node was activated and 
again electromagnetic dropped below gaseous centrifuge to 43.1% while gaseous 
centrifuge jumped ahead to 55.9%. The weapon pathways are insensitive to these 
changes in enrichment paths. After concerns by the U.S., Russia halted the transfer of a 
copper vapor laser to Iran. This node was turned off in the network having negligible 
effects on the enrichment paths. 
 In 2003, U.S. diplomats report that the gaseous centrifuge plant near Natanz was 
more advanced than thought. Diplomats said that hundreds of centrifuges were prepared 
to enrich uranium and that parts, such as the high strength tubing, for thousands of others 
were ready to be assembled.40 The high strength aluminum and tube nodes were 
activated causing the gaseous centrifuge pathway to increase to its highest percentage to 
date at 93.7% while the electromagnetic pathway decreased to 6.91%.  
 Also in 2003, another enrichment pathway emerges when the IAEA said that Iran 
has made a pilot plant for laser enrichment and had success in enriching tiny amounts of 
uranium. Researchers in Iran were experimenting with several types of lasers including 
copper vapor and carbon dioxide. The nodes for these lasers were activated and as seen 
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from Fig. 28 there was a jump in the laser pathway to 34.8%. The activation of the laser 
nodes decreased gaseous centrifuge to 61.1% while decreasing the electromagnetic to a 
miniscule 4.04%. The weapon pathways continued to be insensitive to the enrichment 
pathway alterations. 
 The IAEA discovered the blueprints and equipment for the more advanced P-2 
centrifuges which are made of maraging steel.37 The discovery shed light on a previously 
unknown project which was testing the advanced centrifuges. The maraging steel node 
was activated in the network and the gaseous centrifuge pathway increased to 92.3%. 
 Another nuclear program in Iran was discovered in February 2004, this time by 
the United Nations. Iran had been experimenting with polonium, which has use as a 
neutron-initiator is a nuclear weapon.40 The polonium-beryllium initiator node was 
activated. This time the enrichment paths stayed the same and the weapons paths were 
modified. The gun type path dropped to 10.5% while the HEU implosion path 
dramatically increased to 63%. 
 By 2004, the Russians declared they had finished building the Bushehr reactor 
for Iran.37 The domestic reactor node was turned on but it had negligible effects on the 
pathways. 
 In mid-April of 2006 Iran announced they had 164 fully operational centrifuges 
and planned to have a total of 54,000 online.37 This caused the pathway for gaseous 
centrifuge to increase to 100% while all others drop to negligible values. Later that year, 
the president of Iran inaugurated the heavy water plant.40 The addition of the heavy 
water plant node changes the weapons path to a considerable degree. The plutonium 
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implosion path increases to 38.4% at the expense of the HEU implosion path which 
decreases to 39.6%. Expectedly, this has no effect on the enrichment pathway. 
 The Iranian case provided insight into how the network responds when many 
paths are pursued over time. In the enrichment paths there are several large oscillations 
due to various technology transfers over time. The weapons paths are steadier, but one 
also sees that the acquisition of a large technology such as a heavy water reactor can 
have a nontrivial impact on pathways. 
Sweden 
 
 
Fig. 28. The weapon pathways for Sweden. 
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Fig. 29. The enrichment pathways for Sweden. 
 
 An interesting historical case to consider was that of Sweden, a nation that put 
serious thought and attempts into a nuclear weapons program but eventually abandoned 
the pursuit. 
 Interest in the development of nuclear weapons in Sweden began during the early 
days of the Cold War. The threat from the Soviet Union prompted initial interest in the 
late forties and by the early fifties some Swedish military officials were making public 
statements about nuclear weapon acquisition. The first step in that direction came in 
1957 when a small amount of plutonium was obtained from England.43 The plutonium 
node was activated and the reactor node was left untouched. The percentage for the 
plutonium weapon increased to 7.78% while the HEU weapons expectedly remained at 
zero as seen in Fig. 28. By the end of the decade, Swedish weapon designers had 
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perfected implosion technology.43 The implosion knowledge node was activated and the 
plutonium weapon pathway further increased to 29.8%. 
 Steps were made to create a research reactor and there were plans set to build a 
reprocessing plant. However, in 1964 nuclear officials abandoned the reprocessing plant 
idea due to the cost.44 The reprocessing capability node was de-activated. The reactor 
project was also cancelled in 1970 due to both cost and design complexity.44 The reactor 
node was turned off. The weapon pathway stayed the same because the plutonium node 
was still activated. The enrichment pathway remained at negligible values the entire time 
as seen in Fig. 29. The negligible values show that the network does model a null case in 
which a weapon was pursued but not all the way through. It is interesting to note that 
when Sweden signed the NPT in 1972, they had no technical barriers to producing such 
a weapon.43 While the likelihood of having the plutonium weapon was low at around 
30%, the fact that it was non-negligible shows an accurate reflection of the path that 
would be taken if the Swedes did choose to have a weapon. 
IV.D. Conclusions on Verification and Validation 
 The above cases show that there is a correlation between national security need 
and a strong choice of one path. In the case of Russia for example, once the United 
States had the bomb, the Russians pursued one path through to completion. India also 
pursued one path after China had the bomb. The above cases show that the choice of 
path is linked to the technology transfer they had access to. For example, India received 
a reactor from Canada so they began heading down the plutonium path.  Choice of 
pathway in general is influenced by technology transfer as is shown by the South 
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African case and the oscillations in pathways for several of the Middle Eastern countries. 
The network best demonstrates proliferation in a peaceful world, meaning a world in 
which not every pathway is attempted at once such as the United States during World 
War II. Also, it is best at showing the pathways leading to the first successful 
development of a weapon. Once a state has a certain type of weapon and they begin to 
go down another path, the already activated nodes will still be on and it will lead to a 
balancing of the paths as was seen in the case of Pakistan after they received a 
reprocessing plant. At this point, it will not be as clear what the most likely path will be. 
From looking at the historical cases, any pathway value above 50% implies a serious 
pursuit of that pathway. It should be cautioned that values below 50% should be viewed 
as emerging pathways which are often accompanied by several others.  
 The network presented in this work does not have the ability to ever truly be 
validated due to an insufficient amount of historical cases. There simply is not enough 
historical data to obtain sufficient statistics. However, the above nine cases demonstrate 
that the network has been verified to a sufficient degree. The behavior of the network is 
in accordance with what is expected is such situations and ultimately gives the same 
outcome as the historical cases. A network such as this, while never being able to 
validated, can be useful to learn from. The hypothetical cases that follow support the use 
of this network as a learning tool. 
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CHAPTER V 
ASSESSMENT OF NETWORK RESULTS 
V.A. Hypothetical Cases 
The results of the historical cases concluded that the network does in fact behave 
as it should and the network can be used as a learning tool to assess the impact of 
technology transfers. In order to test the impact of nuclear technology transfer in the 
network, a few hypothetical cases were tried using Saudi Arabia, Syria, Myanmar, and 
Japan. The goal was to see the impact technologies such as reactors, enrichment 
facilities, and reprocessing plants had on the likelihood of being on certain weapon 
paths. Another goal was to assess the impact export control laws have by seeing how 
pathways change depending if these nodes are activated or not. The intent of the 
activations and de-activations of the export control nodes was to see how sensitive 
pathways are to certain technologies in order to give policymakers more informed 
information regarding nonproliferation matters.  
 In performing the sensitivity of pathways to the access a state has to 
technologies, two worlds were considered. The first was a world in which the export 
control laws were extremely loose, meaning that a state has easy access to any of the 
export control items. Loose export control laws were modeled in the network by 
activating all of the export control components and materials. The second world was one 
in which there were tight export controls, meaning that a nation was effectively blocked 
from acquiring any of the export control items. Tight export controls were modeled in 
the network by de-activating all of the export control components and materials. 
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Saudi Arabia 
 The weapons pathways for Saudi Arabia with loose export controls and no 
reactor, enrichment, or reprocessing technology are shown in Fig. 30, indicating Saudi 
Arabia is more than twice as likely to pursue the HEU implosion pathway as the 
plutonium implosion pathway. Given the need for two facilities, a reactor and a 
reprocessing plant, to make a plutonium weapon as opposed to just the enrichment 
facility for an HEU weapon, the result makes sense. The gun type and HEU implosion 
type are of similar value. 
 
 
Fig. 30. Loose export controls but no reactor, enrichment, or reprocessing for Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
 
 
 Supposing Saudi Arabia is given or domestically builds a reactor, the reactor 
node was activated. What is seen in Fig 31is close to an increase in the plutonium 
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to the single digits. The network indicates that the plutonium path has a remarkable 
degree of sensitivity to the reactor node when all of the export control items are 
activated. This sensitivity to the reactor node makes sense since it is the reactor that 
begins to breed plutonium. 
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Fig. 31. Loose export controls and a reactor for Saudi Arabia. 
 
 If Saudi Arabia also acquired reprocessing technology, thus activating the 
reprocessing capability node, the plutonium implosion path continued to increase to 
74.1% as seen in Fig. 32. Both of the HEU paths drop to zero. Again this result makes 
sense because the reprocessing facility extracts the plutonium from the spent fuel, 
allowing it to be used for the weapon. 
 
 
Fig. 32. Loose export controls with a reactor and reprocessing facility for Saudi Arabia. 
 
 Now, suppose Saudi Arabia is in a world with loose export controls but they do 
not have a reactor or a reprocessing plant but instead acquire enrichment capability. Fig. 
33 shows that the HEU implosion path increases to almost 58.4%  and the gun type 
increases to 41.6% while the plutonium and gun-type remain close to zero. The 
plutonium path‟s decrease to zero is sensible because if a state does have enrichment 
capability, the HEU weapon would become the most likely path.  
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Fig. 33. Loose export controls and enrichment capability acquired by Saudi Arabia. 
 
 The next hypothetical scenario is Saudi Arabia in a world with very tight export 
controls. Tight export controls are modeled in the network by de-activating all of the 
export control materials and components. 
 Initially Saudi Arabia has no reactor, reprocessing, or enrichment capabilities. 
The results in Fig. 34 show negligible values for all weapons path indicating that not 
proliferating is the most likely path. Already this is a substantial difference from the 
world with loose export controls.  
 
 
Fig. 34. Tight export controls but no reactor, enrichment, or reprocessing for Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
 
 
 As simulated before, Saudi Arabia is now given a reactor. Fig. 35 shows that 
nothing increases with any of the weapons paths. The lack of increase in the pathways 
says that having the ability to breed plutonium does not increase the likelihood of 
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acquiring a nuclear weapon if all the other technologies towards weapons manufacturing 
are blocked.  
 
 
Fig. 35. Tight export controls and a reactor for Saudi Arabia. 
 
 A reprocessing plant is given to Saudi Arabia in addition to the reactor in Fig. 
36.. Even the addition of the reprocessing plant does not make the pathways in the 
network increase if all of the components and materials are turned off. 
 
 
Fig. 36. Tight export controls with a reactor and reprocessing facility for Saudi Arabia. 
 
 What is being modeled here is a theoretically perfect world in which there is no 
way that Saudi Arabia can obtain this material from another country. The reality is that 
no security regime is perfect and items can and do slip through. There is also the 
possibility of technologies being transferred through black market networks such as the 
A.Q. Khan network. Lastly, there is the possibility of a nation making some of the 
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necessary materials or components themselves. These two hypothetical scenarios serve 
as a learning simulation that continues to show that the network behaves as it should. 
 Continuing the scenario shown in Fig. 37, suppose that Saudi Arabia 
domestically created high purity magnesium and are given an explosives package from 
an underground network. The corresponding nodes in the network are activated and 
there is a jump in the plutonium implosion path to 46%.  
 
 
Fig. 37. Saudi Arabia pathways with a reactor, reprocessing plant, high purity 
magnesium, and explosives package. 
 
 
 
 What the above scenario reminds is that the world is not perfect and technologies 
do get transferred or manufactured. Once large facilities are in place that can be used for 
weapons purposes, the pathways to a nuclear weapon are highly sensitive to transfers of 
material and components. 
 Now suppose that Saudi Arabia does not have a reactor or reprocessing 
capability but are now given enrichment capability. Fig. 38 shows that with tight export 
controls, this transfer does not have an effect on the pathways. 
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Fig. 38. Tight export controls and enrichment capability acquired by Saudi Arabia. 
 
Now suppose Saudi Arabia acquires high purity calcium and a tamper. 
 
 
Fig. 39. Saudi Arabia with enrichment capability, high purity calcium, and a tamper. 
 
 The activation of the high purity calcium and tamper nodes caused a large jump 
in the HEU gun path if Saudi Arabia had enrichment capability as seen in Fig. 39. This 
result is sensible because the enrichment plant makes HEU which the high purity 
calcium puts into metallic form for the weapon pit, and the tamper is a key component to 
the gun weapon.  
 If they acquire a weapons package instead of a tamper, the HEU implosion path 
jumps to 98.5% in Fig. 40. As expected, the other pathways remain negligible. 
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Fig. 40. Saudi Arabia with enrichment capability, high purity calcium, and a weapons 
package. 
 
 
  
These results continue to demonstrate the sensitivity of the pathways to components and 
materials once large technologies are activated. 
Syria 
 In order to compare a country with similar available infrastructure, technical 
capability, and international networking but different motivations, Syria was chosen. The 
same methodology used with Saudi Arabia was followed. 
 Loose export controls were modeled first with none of the large facilities such as 
reactors, reprocessing plants, or enrichment facilities. Fig. 41 shows that the HEU gun-
type path is the most likely path. The difference in values for Syria and Saudi Arabia 
with loose export controls and no other large-scale facilities can be accounted for in the 
network by two reasons. While the available infrastructure metric for both countries is 
extremely low, Saudi Arabia‟s is twice as large as Syria. This difference is important to 
note since the plutonium path requires twice as many large scale facilities to follow and 
the HEU gun-type is the least sophisticated. Another reason the results differ is that the 
motivations used slightly differ. Syria would be primarily motivated by deterring an 
attack from Israel while Saudi Arabia would be primarily motivated by going nuclear 
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before their rival Iran. An HEU gun-type weapon would be sufficient for both of these 
reasons but the Saudi Arabian motivation is slightly more biased on the side of 
plutonium especially if their rival is pursuing such a path. For Syria, any weapon would 
be sufficient. 
 
 
Fig. 41. Loose export controls but no reactor, enrichment, or reprocessing for Syria. 
 
 When Syria was given a reactor, the plutonium path increased to 17.5%, which is 
much less than the 67% that Saudi Arabia increased to. This is shown in Fig. 42. 
 
 
Fig. 42. Loose export controls and a reactor for Syria. 
 
 If Syria was also given a reprocessing plant, and Fig. 43 shows that it became 
even more obvious that the plutonium path was the one being taken with a likelihood of 
71.5%. The HEU paths decrease to zero. The plutonium path was now roughly the same 
as it was for Saudi Arabia in the identical scenario.  
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Fig. 43. Loose export controls with a reactor and reprocessing plant for Syria. 
 
 If Syria was given enrichment technology instead of a reactor and reprocessing 
plant, the HEU gun path increased to 83.5% and the HEU implosion path to 16.1% as 
seen in Fig. 44.  Due to the lack of advancement of Syria, their most likely pathway is 
the less sophisticated gun-type device. 
 
Fig. 44. Loose export controls with an enrichment facility for Syria. 
 
 The Syrian network was modeled with tight export controls. The initial pathways 
are shown in Fig. 45. As with Saudi Arabia, the addition of reactor, reprocessing, or 
enrichment capability has no effect on the pathways if all of the export control materials 
and components are effectively blocked. 
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Fig. 45. Tight export control and the addition of either reactor, enrichment, or 
reprocessing technology for Syria. 
 
 
 
 Supposing that Syria had enrichment capability and they were given a complete 
weapons package and high purity calcium, the pathway for the HEU implosion increased 
to 71.2% as shown in Fig. 46. This increase is roughly the same percentage that Saudi 
Arabia had in the same scenario and it again indicates the sensitivity of the HEU 
pathway once the calcium and package components were added given that enrichment 
ability is attained. 
 
 
Fig. 46. Tight export controls with enrichment capability, high purity calcium, and 
weapons package acquired by Syria. 
 
 
 
 If Syria has enrichment capability and they steal a tamper the HEU gun path 
increases to 23.7% in Fig. 47. While a tamper is also a component of an implosion 
device, the blocking of all the other pieces in that path has prevented it from increasing. 
Acquired Device
HEU Gun 
HEU Implosion
Pu Implosion
None
 0 +
.014
.014
 100
Acquired Device
HEU Gun 
HEU Implosion
Pu Implosion
None
0.19
71.2
13.6
15.0
 104 
The limited pieces necessary for a gun type caused the addition of this key node to have 
a substantial impact. 
 
 
Fig. 47. Tight export controls with enrichment capability, high purity calcium, and 
tamper acquired by Syria. 
 
 
 
 If Syria has a reactor and reprocessing technology and they illicitly obtain an 
explosives package and high purity magnesium, the pathway for the HEU paths remain 
at zero and the pathway for the plutonium path increases to 3.89% as seen in Fig 48. 
Under the same scenario, the Saudi Arabian plutonium pathway increased to nearly 
20%. This difference could again be accounted for by the difference in infrastructure and 
motivations. 
 
Fig. 48. Syrian pathways with a reactor, reprocessing plant, high purity magnesium, and 
explosives package. 
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Myanmar 
 Myanmar ranked at the very bottom of the technical capability and available 
infrastructure metrics. They did however, rank slightly above Saudi Arabia and Syria 
when it came to international networking. Myanar‟s potential motivations were not as 
lucid as Saudi Arabia and Syria, making several motivations a possible impetus. 
 The loose export control scenario was run and it yielded the results shown in Fig. 
49. The HEU gun-type was the most likely path with a value similar to Syria. The 
different metrics and motivations can account for the difference. 
 
 
Fig. 49.  Loose export controls with no reactor, reprocessing, or enrichment technology 
in Myanmar. 
 
 
 
 When a reactor was added the HEU and plutonium implosion path changed 
positions so that the plutonium path was the most likely at 61.1% and the HEU path was 
next at 26.1% as seen in Fig. 50. 
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Fig. 50. Loose export controls with a reactor given to Myanmar. 
 
 These values show that Myanmar was slightly more likely to pursue a plutonium 
path than Syria but much less likely than Saudi Arabia. When reprocessing was added to 
Syria the pathway for plutonium implosion increased to 73.2% in Fig. 51. 
 
 
Fig. 51. Loose export controls and a reactor and reprocessing plant given to Myanmar. 
 
 Also like Syria, if Myanmar is given an enrichment plant instead, the pathway for 
the HEU gun-type implosion increases to 85.5%% while the other paths decrease to near 
zero as seen in Fig 52. 
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Fig. 52. Loose export controls and an enrichment facility given to Myanmar. 
 
 The same scenarios run with tight export controls yielded the same results as 
with the past two countries, as seen in Fig. 53. 
 
 
Fig. 53. Tight export controls effectively block Myanmar weapon pathways regardless of 
transferring reactor, enrichment, and reprocessing technologies. 
 
 
 
 Also similar to the other countries, the pathways are sensitive to component and 
material acquisitions if the large-scale facilities are given. For example, if Myanmar 
acquires a weapons package and high purity magnesium while they have a reactor and 
reprocessing plant, their likelihood of a plutonium implosion weapon increases to 74.7% 
as seen in Fig. 54. This is approximately the same percentage as for the respective 
scenarios with Saudi Arabia and Syria. 
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Fig. 54. Myanmar pathways with a reactor, reprocessing capability, high purity 
magnesium, and a weapons package. 
 
 
 If Myanmar has access to high purity magnesium and a weapons package and 
have an enrichment plant instead of a reactor or reprocessing plant then the HEU 
implosion path increases to 97%. This is shown in Fig. 55. 
 
 
Fig. 55. Myanmar pathways with an enrichment plant, high purity magnesium and a 
weapons package. 
 
 
 
 If instead they acquire high purity calcium and a tamper with the enrichment 
capability, then the pathway for the gun-type increases to 33.8% as seen in Fig. 56. 
 
 
Fig. 56. Myanmar pathways with an enrichment path, high purity calcium, and a tamper. 
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Japan 
 Now considering the world actually lived in, the nation of Japan possesses 
reactor, enrichment, and reprocessing technology.  
 
 
Fig. 57. Japan with enrichment, reprocessing, and reactor technology, and all other nodes 
left alone. 
 
 
 
 Fig. 57 shows the most likely path is the HEU implosion. If Japan now acquires a 
tamper, all paths nearly double, as seen in Fig. 58. 
 
 
Fig. 58. Japan with a tamper. 
 
 If instead of a tamper they are given a weapons package, the implosion path 
quadruples while the gun path drops near zero as seen if Fig. 59. This result again 
demonstrates that the network sides with the HEU path if all major technologies are 
acquired. To correct for this, both the HEU and plutonium nodes were activated. 
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Fig. 59. Japan with a weapons package. 
 
 When the plutonium and HEU nodes are activated in addition to the reactor, 
enrichment, and reprocessing nodes the plutonium and uranium implosion paths are 
nearly equivalent with the gun path being about half the amount as shown in Fig. 60. 
The activations of the plutonium and HEU nodes correct for the discrepancy in values 
that the network gives to the HEU and plutonium pathways as a result of the reactor, 
reprocessing, and enrichment nodes being activated.  
 
 
Fig. 60. Japan with both HEU and plutonium nodes activated. 
 
 The tamper node was activated and the plutonium implosion path was roughly 
the same value as the HEU implosion path as seen in Fig 61. 
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Fig. 61. Japan with both HEU and plutonium nodes activated in addition to a tamper. 
 
 The weapons package was then activated instead of the tamper and again one 
sees that the implosion paths were again similar in value in Fig. 62. 
 
 
Fig. 62. Japan with a weapons package. 
 
V.B. Assessment of Results 
There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the examples from 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Myanmar, and Japan. The first is that, in a world with loose export 
controls where a state proliferator has easy access to nuclear weapon components and 
materials, technology transfers such as reactors, reprocessing plants, and enrichment 
facilities greatly increase the likelihood of pursuing weapons paths. Second, in a world 
with tight export controls where a state proliferator is restricted from obtaining nuclear 
weapon components and materials, technology transfers such as reactors, reprocessing 
plants, and enrichment facilities do not increase the likelihood of pursuing weapons 
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paths but make the paths highly sensitive to component and material acquisitions. 
Finally, different states‟ paths will increase in likelihood differently depending on their 
motivations, available infrastructure, technical capability, and international networking. 
It is important to remember when analyzing the above results regarding the 
pathway probabilities that these value represent, at a given instant in time, the likelihood 
of a given nation being on a given path. The probability values represent the user‟s belief 
that a nation is pursuing a pathway given the available infrastructure, technical 
capability, international networking, motivations which are linked to intentions, and 
prior beliefs about how likely a given piece of evidence impacts a path. What was 
presented in this work was a learning tool that has the ability to give insight into the 
pursuit of different pathways leading towards the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. This 
tool and the graphs and values generated above are not intended to be used to predict 
what path a nation will take. Instead, it assesses the likelihood at a given moment in time 
that a given path is being pursued. 
V.C. Insights and Advantages 
The results the network yields are insightful for several reasons. First, the results 
take into account how technical ability and transfers impact pathways in addition to 
other motivating factors, providing a quantitative way to test the impact of proliferation 
factors that can be ascribed to both realist and idealist proliferation theories. Second, the 
network allows one to see the extent of impact of technologies by comparing the values 
of the probabilities. Third, inclusion of metrics describing available infrastructure, 
technical capability, and international networking as is relevant to nuclear weapon 
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acquisition insures that a detailed assessment of each country tested is performed before 
evidence is even added. 
Two key advantages the network has is its ease of use and the flexibility the user 
has in modifying the various weights. The graphical user interface of Netica clearly 
displays all of the nodes with their associated probabilities and they can easily be 
activated or de-activated by clicking on them. The weights on how the motivations effect 
the intentions, those associated with the available infrastructure, technical capability, and 
international networking, and a given evidence node‟s impact on a pathway node can all 
be easily changed too. The subjectivity in the weights associated with the different 
motivations, resources, and components allows not only flexibility in use but also can 
mirror an adversary‟s decision process. While it takes expert elicitation on a grander 
scale to pin down the most appropriate weights, considering which pieces matter more 
by looking at historical cases is also beneficial to the learning process and will be similar 
to the thought patterns used by a present-day nation that is considering choosing a given 
pathway. This consideration highlights the nature of the network as a learning tool as 
opposed to a code to be validated. A network such as this will never be able to have 
sufficient statistics to be validated in any scientific sense of the word. There are simply 
not enough historical cases, and the decision process itself is subjective. However, 
running the network through a number of historical cases has shown that the network 
does act as it should given certain inputs. Thus, what was demonstrated in this study was 
an adequate verification of a network that gives insight into the most likely path a nation 
would take in making a nuclear weapon.  
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V.D. Limitations 
In addition to the insights and advantages provided by the network, there are 
limitations. As with any network, the results output are only as good as the data input. 
This not only means the accuracy of the information detailing the infrastructure, 
technical ability, international networking, and motivations, but also whether a nation 
does in fact have a certain component or material. While data such as GDP and number 
of nuclear agreements signed may be easy to access with a high confidence of it being 
correct, knowing for sure whether they are motivated by a specific reason or if they 
secretly acquired a technology will not be. As with any intelligence assessment tool, it is 
limited by what is not known, and this database of unknowns could go on indefinitely. 
However, given what is known for sure, the network is able to assess the most likely 
path taken at a given period of time. The only other caveat involved with this statement 
is that it does in fact give the most likely path. Since the probabilities are normalized to 
one, if evidence is added to increase one path, there is a necessary decrease in the other 
paths. Therefore, if multiple paths are being pursued, this will not be as clearly evinced 
by the probabilities. The network gives the relative probability of one path compared to 
the others. The inability to show parallel paths is a key limitation of the network.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 We effectively developed a computational tool to assess the most likely path a 
state proliferator would take in developing a nuclear weapon. A previous Bayesian 
network based on nuclear weapon proliferation was expanded to include dual-use export 
controlled technologies. The constant nodes in the network quantifying technical 
capability, international networking, and available infrastructure were developed to be 
based off of pertinent characteristics that were appropriately weighted. A literature 
review and expert elicitation were used to determine weighted motivations for a number 
of countries which would be run through the network. To see if the network gave 
accurate results, nine historical cases of state proliferation were run through the network 
over time and the weapon and enrichment pathways were graphed. The network 
sufficiently modeled the cases so it was concluded that, while never truly being able to 
sufficiently validate a network of this type, sufficient verification was achieved. The tool 
was then used to gain knowledge and insight concerning technology transfers with four 
countries in hypothetical cases. What was proven by this was that the network can in fact 
be used to learn about state proliferation under different policies and conditions. 
 What was created was a computational tool that sufficiently modeled historical 
cases of state proliferation and can facilitate in learning from a variety of hypothetical 
scenarios. A network of this form is not designed to be validated due to a statistically 
insignificant amount of historical data however by modeling nine different historical 
cases of proliferation it was sufficiently verified. The historical cases showed that the 
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network gives the most likely path at a given instant in time. The network puts a 
quantitative value on the affect that a developed or acquired nuclear technology has on 
proliferation paths. In performing the hypothetical cases, the values gave insight into the 
extent of the impact a technology transfer or development has under varying conditions. 
We learned that proliferation pathways are sensitive to technology transfers. The path 
chosen is dependent on the type of large scale technology (reactor, enrichment, or 
reprocessing facility) the given state has and the rigidity of the export control regime. 
Even in a world with tight export controls, transfers of weapon components greatly 
affects the likelihood of weapon paths. This insight makes the network a useful learning 
tool to not only assess the most likely path a state proliferator might take but also to 
understand the type of policies that can deter proliferation in the future.  
 There are several avenues for future work. The network can continue to be 
analyzed to improve upon weighting factors.  If the appropriate weights on the dual-use 
items can be attained, it will give even more credence to the importance of export 
control rules. The network can continue to be run on a number of countries, both 
historical for further verification purposes and hypothetical to assess present-day 
proliferation concerns. The network itself can be expanded to include nodes for different 
types of reactors and fusion and fission boosted weapons can be added to the weapons 
paths.  
 Given the insights the network provided in the hypothetical cases, it can also be 
used to assess the impact of different U.S. policies towards nations. For example, section 
123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act details the agreements set forth by the U.S. regarding 
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nuclear cooperation with other nations concerning the exchanging of technology, the 
sharing of scientific research, and engaging in safeguard discussions. The tool can be 
used to learn the impact of the U.S. engaging problematic nations aspiring to have 
nuclear technology compared to neglecting to have any involvement.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXPERT ELICITATION ON STATE MOTIVATIONS 
 Russia 
(Pre-
1949) 
France 
(1950s) 
India ( 
Pre-
1974) 
Israel 
(1960s) 
Pakistan 
(after A.Q. 
Kahn 
returned,  
1976) 
Iraq 
(pre-
1991) 
Iran 
(2000-
present) 
South 
Africa 
(late 
1960s-
1970s) 
Deter Attack From 
Nuclear Adversary 
4 1 4 4 3 4 1 2 
Seek Military 
Superiority 
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Redress 
Conventional 
Military Asymmetry 
1 1 1 4 3 3 3 2 
Go Nuclear Before 
Rival 
1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Intimidate Non-
Nuclear Rivals 
1 1 2 4 1 2 2 2 
Acquire Position in 
International 
Forums 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Rise to Global 
Power Status 
2 3 3 1 1 2 2 1 
Enhance General 
International Status 
1 3 3 1 2 2 2 1 
Demonstrate 
National Viability 
1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 
Assert 
military/political 
independence 
1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Divert domestic 
attention 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Enhance Bargaining 
Position w/in 
Alliance w/ Nuclear 
Powers 
1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Deter Regional 
Intervention by 
Superpower 
1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 
Increase 
Military/Scientific 
Morale 
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Increase Domestic 
Morale 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Reduce Economic 
Defense Burden 
0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 
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